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Abstract
This thesis studies the effects of the conformity motive and temptation on individual
decision-making. Social dissonance is the discomfort of choosing an action different from
what others have chosen. A game-theoretical framework is used to study situations where
social dissonance influences behavior or expression of opinions. Each individual may have
different intrinsic preferences but is affected by the same “institution” which is modeled by
a social dissonance function that evaluates the negative effect of disagreement with others.
Equilibria of social dissonance games have properties such as monotonicity of choices with
respect to intrinsic preferences, and monotone comparative statics with respect to changes
in intrinsic preferences and institutions. “Impulse and Temptation” acknowledges that
consumers who purchase larger packages of certain goods are tempted to consume more
than originally needed. The analysis attempts to understand policies that prohibit the
purchase of smaller packages, exploring issues of consumer naivete about temptation and
addiction. It makes little sense to restrict access to small packages in a one-period model
with or without consumer naivete, but it is possible that in a multi-period setting, defense
against addiction is a valid reason for prohibiting sale of small packages of tempting goods.
ii
Contents
Acknowledgements i
Abstract ii
List of Figures v
1 Introduction 1
2 Social Dissonance and Individual Choice 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Social Dissonance Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1 Dissonance Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Two-Action Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.1 Supermodularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.2 Equilibria of Two-Action Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6 Example Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6.1 Game with Two Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6.2 Game with Two Types and Indifferent Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6.3 Dixit Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
i
2.7 Cascades and Entrapment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.7.1 Entrapment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.8 Games with More than Two Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3 Social Dissonance in a Model with a Continuum of Agents 37
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.1 Dissonance Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.2 Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Two-Action Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.1 Supermodularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.2 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.4 Games with a Finite Number of Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4.1 Games with Two Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4.2 Games with Indifferent Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5 Games with a Continuum of Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.5.1 Assumptions on Functional Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.5.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5.3 Basic Linear Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5.4 General Linear Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.6 Social Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6.1 Challenges in Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.6.2 Shifting Institutions and Drifting Intrinsic Utilities . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.7 Dynamic Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.7.1 Two-Period Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
ii
4 Impulse and Temptation 66
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.1 Consumers in the One-Period Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3.2 Behavioral Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3.3 Consumers in the Multi-Period Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3.4 Behavioral Types in the Multi-Period Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3.5 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4 Model with Discrete Impulse Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4.1 Decisions in the One-Period Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4.2 Consumer Naivete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4.3 Two-Period Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.5 Future Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5 Conclusion and Discussion 92
References 95
Appendix A. Chapter 2 101
A.1 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.1.1 General Two-Action Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.1.2 Two-Type Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.2 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Appendix B. Chapter 3 105
B.1 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
iii
Appendix C. Chapter 4 107
C.1 Additional Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
C.2 Expected Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
C.2.1 One Period Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
C.2.2 Two Period Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
iv
List of Figures
3.1 Finding asymmetric equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Example dissonance function, with interval of constant differences . . . . . 53
3.3 Example dissonance function, strictly decreasing differences . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Finding the threshold agent in the basic linear model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5 Social dissonance game with single monolithic equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.6 Social dissonance game with true-to-type and monolithic equilibria . . . . . 58
3.7 Social dissonance game with single true-to-type equilibrium . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1 Self-reported number of cigarettes smoked per day for current smokers. . . . 68
4.2 Timing of impulses and decisions in the one-period model . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3 Timing of impulses and decisions in the multi-period model . . . . . . . . . 75
A.1 Survey responses to opinion poll on same-sex marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
v
Chapter 1
Introduction
Our conscious decisions are influenced by hidden factors, both internal and external, that
all the accumulated science of the world is still struggling to understand. Developments in
the past few decades have been questioning and defining the boundaries between conscious
and unconscious, individual and social. As consumers and citizens, we behave in ways
that are connected to the people and objects around us. The essays in this thesis examine
interactions between individual preferences and outside influences, and how policy can
either intensify or diminish the power of those influences.
Social dissonance is the discomfort of choosing an action or opinion different from
others. The level of discomfort from disagreement is in part determined by the attitude set
by institutions: messages from laws, leaders, and language correspond to a social dissonance
function. Just as the people in one’s society can affect decisions, so can the goods that we
purchase and possess. In “Impulse and Temptation,” I ask whether it is a helpful policy
to prohibit consumers from purchasing small quantities of goods in order to satisfy an
impulse, when purchases of larger quantities feed the temptation to consume further.
The first two essays discuss games with social dissonance. Chapter 2 introduces the
model of Social Dissonance Games in a finite-agent setting, focusing on the study of two-
action games. I present a model of individual choice within a society where conformity
1
2enters the decision-making process. Conformity for its own sake can be a powerful motive,
even when one’s intrinsic character is crying out to express itself in a different way. In
certain situations, intrinsic preference is in conflict with social norms, and the individual
experiences social dissonance when choosing differently than others. I characterize the
equilibrium sets of social dissonance games and describe conditions under which true-to-
type behavior is an equilibrium. In general, I show that equilibrium action profiles obey
monotonicity: arranging agents in descending order of their liking of one action relative
to its alternative, agents up to some threshold will choose the first action and the rest of
the agents will choose its alternative. I then establish the supermodularity, or strategic
complementarity, of social dissonance games, which allows us to use the results of Milgrom
and Roberts (1990) to guarantee existence of a pure strategy equilibrium and monotone
comparative statics properties. The equilibrium sets are monotone with respect to players’
intrinsic utilities in that when intrinsic utility for one action increases relative to the other,
equilibria shift toward that favored action. Likewise, when the social dissonance function
for one action decreases relative to the other, equilibria shift toward the action with lowered
dissonance.
Individuals may weigh others’ attitudes on an aggregate level, rather than on a person
by person basis. In a large population, this means that one ordinary individual cannot
influence behavior single-handedly. When a widespread change in opinion would otherwise
occur, a switching cost may prevent the coordinated shift. To handle these possibilities,
Chapter 3 provides extensions of the Social Dissonance model to allow for a continuum
of agents and dynamics, and discusses use of the model in empirical analysis. The main
results from the finite-agent model - monotonicity with respect to intrinsic utilities, su-
permodularity, and monotone comparative statics - carry over to the continuum model.
One additional artifact of the continuum model is that asymmetric equilibria exist where
agents with a clear intrinsic preference for one action over the other can be divided into
two groups that choose different actions. The continuum of agents model lends itself well
3to empirical applications. Assumptions about the continuity of social dissonance functions
and the distribution of player types may allow for a closed-form solution to such games,
especially when the specification is linear.
In Chapter 4, “Impulse and Temptation,” I address a policy question about the packag-
ing of unhealthy products such as cigarettes, and focus on the internal forces of temptation
and addiction. Specifically, I ask whether the removal of a small package from the choice set
inhibits or promotes excess consumption. Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) among others have
noted that the mere presence of tempting alternatives alongside one’s optimal choice can
actually decrease the utility of an agent. A tempted agent must exercise costly self-control
or else succumb to a harmful choice. I present a model of Impulse and Temptation where
agents facing an impulse to consume choose from a set of packages with different quantities
of the same good. After the initial impulse, choice of package, and initial consumption,
agents may face an additional impulse to consume. The probability of this follow-on “temp-
tation” impulse is increasing in the size of the package purchased, so agents may wish to
purchase a small package in order to reduce temptation. It is clear that in the one-period
model with sophisticated consumers, removing the small package from the choice set can
only reduce welfare. Further, consumer naivete about the strength of temptations does not
seem to justify prohibition of small packages. In a two-period model, it is possible that
removal of small packages may be justified by a process of addiction where consumption
leads to greater impulses in the future.
Chapter 2
Social Dissonance and Individual
Choice
2.1 Introduction
Individuals, and the decisions they make, are rarely isolated. As consumers and business
owners, we realize that our actions will be observed and judged by others, and we learn to
judge our own actions as we think others in our society would. We have different preferences
but are all subject to the pressure to do as others do. In a society full of many others who
choose an action in line with our wishes, a decision is easy. However, a battle takes place in
one’s mind when society’s choices clash with one’s own preferred action. Social dissonance
is the discomfort or disutility of choosing an action different from others.
In social dissonance games, agents have intrinsic preferences regarding their own actions
and also care about what others are doing. The intrinsic preferences can capture the
pecuniary value of different actions, the emotional attachment to different alternatives, or
deeply-held moral values. Agents’ payoffs also depend on how many others choose the
same action. When others choose differently, a cost, social dissonance is incurred. A social
dissonance function captures the impact of institutions, including laws, leaders, language,
4
5and culture.
The effect of social dissonance manifests itself in opinion polls, market behavior, and
social norms. When our political opinions are elicited, even in the absence of company,
we consider our internal attitudes and the likely opinions of others in society. In a survey,
support for a particular issue is based on what we think and also what we think we should
think. These shoulds are informed by our beliefs about others’ attitudes - would they agree
or disagree? If our opinions were made public, how would that impact others’ opinions of
us?
Public support for same-sex marriage in the United States reached the point where a
majority of Americans favor its legalization, with support increasing from 40% in 2009 to
55% in 2014.1 (Gallup, 2014). While a small percentage of Americans have a personal
stake in the legal status of same-sex marriage2 , many know someone who would benefit
from legalization. Another compelling reason to favor same-sex marriage is that many
others in the community also favor it. Likewise, if others in the community oppose it then
we may feel compelled to also express opposition.
Since the year 2010, American institutions have shifted in their treatment of same-sex
marriage. Most notably, the law has made progress toward giving same-sex couples the
same privileges as heterosexual couples. Leaders have spoken in support of the rights of
same-sex couples. Additionally, there has been a shift in the language of the conversation.
All of these factors have reduced social dissonance for supporters of same-sex marriage,
making it easier to express their opinions, even when in the presence of implied dissent.
Social dissonance is weighed in financial decisions as well. One such decision is whether
or not a homeowner should default on a housing loan. In some jurisdictions, borrowers are
allowed to walk away from their mortgages without recourse for the lender. Even when
recourse is available, high legal costs can discourage lenders from suing defaulted borrowers.
1 See figure 1 in appendix B for the data series.
2 The percentage of Americans who identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender (GLBT) is
estimated at around 4%.
6Of course, the borrower’s future ability to obtain credit will suffer, but some may feel it is
worth that cost to escape the debt. Strategic defaults are those in which the borrower has
adequate financial means, but discontinues payments because the value of the mortgage
exceeds the value of the house.
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) consider three groups of factors important in the
decision-making process of the borrower. Firstly, the borrower compares the pecuniary
value of defaulting to that of continuing to pay the mortgage; if the market value of the
house is lower than the remaining amount to be repaid, the borrower may wish to default.
The damage to the borrower’s credit rating and subsequent reduction in access to credit is
also contained in the category of pecuniary considerations, which, in the model to follow,
would be classified as intrinsic utility. Secondly, the borrower must weigh the relocation
costs that would follow a default. Lastly, there are “moral and social considerations.” Moral
considerations can be defined as those deeply-held beliefs which are not based on others’
observation of one’s behavior, and their value should be included in intrinsic utility. As
one would expect, subjects in Guiso et al.’s survey who said it is immoral to strategically
default were less likely to say they would do so themselves. Social considerations are the
costs resulting from others’ observations and actions. When choosing an action different
from others, we may feel guilt or shame; these emotions are more strongly felt when a
greater number of people take a different action. Conversely, negative emotions associated
with an action are reduced when more people take that action. Guiso et al. found that
survey respondents who knew someone who strategically defaulted on a mortgage are more
likely to express the willingness to do so themselves.
The consumption of certain goods can be influenced by social dissonance. U.S. institu-
tions have aggressively pushed an anti-smoking agenda since the mid-1990’s. This has been
motivated in part by the health hazard of secondhand smoke, of which the public’s estima-
tion remained roughly constant from 1997 to 2007. However, over that same time period,
public support for complete bans on smoking in restaurants rose from 40% to 54% (Gallup,
72007). Smokers represent roughly one-fifth of the adult population. In another survey by
Gallup, 47% of smokers said in 2007 that they feel unjustly discriminated against, up from
32% in 2001. Restricting and taxing smoking may have the benefit of preventing citizens
from becoming smokers and encouraging others to quit, but for some existing smokers,
restrictions do little but expose them to feelings of shame and marginalization. Citizens
who would otherwise choose an unpopular action can be “entrapped” by the high social
dissonance sanctioned by institutions. Worse yet, with intense enough social dissonance,
the unique equilibrium may be one in which some conceal their true opinions and everyone
acts the same way. People may sacrifice voicing their own opinions in order to feel included
(Noelle-Neumann, 1974).
Social dissonance games provide a framework for weighing the relative importance of
intrinsic preferences and the conformity motive in decision-making, and can be used to
predict the response of public actions and opinions to a change in institutions. Using this
framework, I characterize the equilibrium set, and describe the separate effects of shifts in
intrinsic preferences and social dissonance functions. I show that two-action social disso-
nance games belong to a larger class, supermodular games, in which strategic complemen-
tarities exist among agents’ choices. As more agents coordinate on a particular action, the
reduced social dissonance associated with the action makes it more attractive to an agent
that might choose otherwise. I apply the results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990), which
guarantee the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide some monotone com-
parative statics properties. Specifically, if for all agents there is a non-decreasing change
in the intrinsic utility of one action relative to the other, the equilibrium set shifts toward
profiles where more agents select the former action. Conversely, if dissonance for one action
increases relative to the dissonance for the other action, the equilibrium set shifts toward
the latter action.
There are some games where intrinsic utility for a preferred action is strong enough
relative to social dissonance that choosing one’s preferred action is a dominant strategy.
8If this is the case for all agents, there is a unique true-to-type equilibrium. If only some
agents have such strong intrinsic preferences, the other agents may decide to follow them in
choosing the same action; I call this a monolithic equilibrium. If more than one equilibrium
action profile exists, agents may fail to coordinate on the most efficient one.
In general, I show that equilibrium action profiles obey monotonicity: arranging agents
in descending order of their liking of one action relative to its alternative, agents up to some
threshold will choose the first action and the rest of the agents will choose its alternative.
The exception to this is that the group of agents who are intrinsically indifferent between
two alternatives may make different choices. If the indifferent agents split into two groups
choosing either action, this reduces social dissonance for everyone else. However, if they
all choose alike, this only reduces social dissonance for one group.
In a social dissonance game, if institutions remain fixed and beliefs about the opinions
of others do not change, a shift in the equilibrium action profile can be attributed to a
change in agents’ intrinsic utilities. If, however, we observe a change in opinions without
a change in information, there is reason to suspect that a shift in the social dissonance
function was a key factor. When there is a monotone shift in society’s intrinsic utilities
to favor one action, the equilibrium will shift toward an action profile where more agents
choose that action. Similarly, when the dissonance function for one action increases relative
to the dissonance of the other action, the equilibrium set shifts away from the action with
the increased dissonance.
When answering opinion polls, social dissonance is often a salient concern, especially
when respondents are constantly asked for their opinions, and offered no new relevant
information aside from signals about the opinions of others. If there is a decrease in the
social dissonance associated with an opinion, through a public awareness campaign or a
statement of support by a public leader, we would expect the expressed opinions of the
population to shift in the same direction.
In a decision to default on a mortgage, pecuniary concerns weigh heavily, and unless
9there is a campaign to shame defaulters, maximum social dissonance is small relative to
the pecuniary concerns of distressed homeowners. Still, if only a small percentage of the
population defaults, the social dissonance of defaulting is nontrivial and borrowers would
not casually do so because of some small perceived financial advantage. Only those with
the most dire financial circumstances would choose to default. If for some reason the
stigma associated with the behavior is reduced by its increased incidence, an institution
can counter the trend by policies and official statements that increase the social dissonance
of strategic defaults. If, on the other hand, a small segment of the population is feeling
entrapped by public opinion and this is reducing overall welfare, institutions can adjust to
lower social dissonance or to reduce efforts to convert otherwise indifferent agents to the
majority opinion.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 discusses related literature. Section 2.3
defines social dissonance games and dissonance functions. Section 2.4 discusses supermod-
ularity in two-action games and provides a characterization of equilibria, while section 2.5
summarizes comparative statics results. Section 2.6 provides some examples, section 2.7
discusses cascades and entrapment, and section 2.8 addresses games with more than two
actions. Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Literature
The experimental paradigm of Solomon Asch (1951) demonstrates the effect of conformity
pressure on an individual’s choices. Subjects were asked to complete a simple task of
matching a reference line with one of three other lines. The error rate of isolated subjects
was less than 1%, but when asked to respond after a group of confederates unanimously
gave an incorrect answer, subjects made an error in more than one out of three trials.
In economics, the tradition of binary-choice games with externalities dates back to at
least 1973 in Thomas Schelling’s model of aggregate behavior in a binary-choice setting
with externalities. Extending this in Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978), Schelling
10
describes many situations where the payoffs to agents depend on the choices of others,
including a multiperson prisoner’s dilemma and a coordination game. Dybvig and Spatt
(1983) provide a model where agents have heterogeneous intrinsic preferences and, like
Schelling (1973) have their payoffs affected by how many people adopt a certain norm.
The games discussed in this paper are similar to those specified in Dixit (2003), though
the framework here is more general. Dixit specifies linear variation in intrinsic utility and
externalities, and argues that “more general functional forms would generate conditions
that are essentially tautologous.” However, there is something to be learned by including
parameters describing the changing marginal effect of concordant agents and the elimina-
tion of dissonance. Knowing these parameters can help make predictions about, or at least
put bounds on, future behavior.
The positive externality from concordant actions, which can also be viewed as a neg-
ative externality from discordant actions, has been referred to by many names in social
science literature, each with its own connotations. Others have examined the effects of
stigma (Athreya 2004), conformity (Bernheim 1994), network effects (Farrell and Klem-
perer 2007; Easley and Kleinberg 2010), herding (Banerjee 1992), informational cascades
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, Welch 1992), and social customs (Akerlof 1980).
There is a large literature, created mostly in the early 1980’s, dealing with the adoption
of technological standards and the network effects that incentivize a society to choose only
one of two or more competing technologies. For example, Farrell and Saloner (1985) address
the coordination problem of switching to a new technology. A social dissonance game is a
reframing of the coordination problem, with a negative externality that shrinks to zero as
more players choose the same action.
Some of the spirit and language of Bernheim (1994) closely matches my own. Bern-
heim’s model explains the conformity motive by adding an intermediate measure of esteem
or approval of others. Esteem depends on others’ perceptions of one’s preferences, which in
turn are deduced from observing actions. When esteem is sufficiently important relative to
11
intrinsic preferences, individuals conform to a single, homogeneous standard of behavior.
Even so, agents with extreme preferences refuse to conform.
Shaw et al. (1999) describe the process by which individuals use media to learn the
agenda of a community, in order to “remove the social dissonance of being alone and/or
dealing with ambiguity.” The term social dissonance is chosen to indicate that the indi-
vidual is negatively affected by choosing an action or opinion that is dissonant with the
actions and opinions of others. In order to apply the model to a real-life situation, we do not
need to understand the particular motive behind the preference for choosing a concordant
action. We must only be convinced that social dissonance exists.
2.3 Social Dissonance Games
Suppose there are N agents in a society and each agent i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} chooses an action
si from finite strategy space Si. Action profile s = (s1, s2, ..., sN ) lists the choices of the
agents and s−i lists the choices of all agents except i. Agents’ payoffs are captured by utility
functions {U1, U2, ..., UN} which are separable into two components: intrinsic utility and
social dissonance. The intrinsic utility, ui(si), depends only on the agent’s own action, si,
and can be particular to each agent. Complete information is assumed.
The cost due to social dissonance, d, depends on the agent’s action and the number of
other agents choosing that same action. It is a mapping3 d : Si × R+ → R . A single
agent can influence the social dissonance of other agents by his choice of action but the
agent influences his own social dissonance by choosing which group to join.
Agents have identical choice sets; otherwise the idea of social dissonance may not apply
to agents who are unaware of or unable to choose actions that are available to other agents.
For action profile s, let N(s−i, si) be the number of agents other than i who play action
si. The dissonance function can be written as d(si, N(s−i, si)).
3 In finite-agent models, the second argument will be an integer in {0, 1, ..., N − 1}, but defining d(si, ·)
over the real numbers allows for the ability to generalize.
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Assembling the intrinsic utility and social dissonance, the payoff for agent i of action
profile s is
U i(s) = ui(si)− d(si, N(s−i, si)) (2.1)
Each agent wishes to choose an action that is a best response, maximizing his payoff, given
the choices of others. si ∈ Si is a best response to the actions of the other agents, s−i,
if for ti ∈ Si with ti 6= si, ui(si) − d(si, N(s−i, si)) ≥ ui(ti) − d(ti, N(s−i, ti)). This best
response condition may be rewritten as
ui(si)− ui(ti) ≥ d(si, N(s−i, si))− d(ti, N(s−i, ti)) (2.2)
The inequality framed in this way states that the incremental benefit in intrinsic utility
from choosing si must not be outweighed by si’s incremental social dissonance cost.4
A Nash Equilibrium is an action profile, s, where each agent’s action is a best response
to the actions of the other agents. In this paper, attention is restricted to pure-strategy
Nash Equilibria.5 It follows from observation of (2.2) that the best response and the
equilibrium set depend only on the differences in each agent’s intrinsic utility for different
actions and the differences in social dissonance for each profile of actions.
2.3.1 Dissonance Functions
Studies on conformity, including Asch (1951) and Gerard et al.(1968), imply that social
dissonance decreases as the number of agents choosing the same action increases, and these
decreases in social dissonance are greatest with the addition of the first few agents who
choose the same action. When the disagreeing group becomes small enough, dissonance
reaches zero. It is safe to assume there is no social dissonance associated with choosing an
4 If both are negative, the loss in intrinsic benefit must not be outweighed by the reduction in social
dissonance cost.
5 This restriction still allows for agents with the same intrinsic utility to choose differently.
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action that everyone else chooses. These two assumptions will be imposed throughout the
paper:
Assumption 1. For each player i and each action si, d(si, ·) is non-negative and is non-
increasing in the second argument.
Assumption 2. When all other agents choose an action that is concordant with the choice
of a given agent i, i will experience no social dissonance. That is, d(si, N − 1) = 0 6 for
each player i and each si ∈ Si.
One additional assumption on the dissonance function which may be imposed, and can
make analysis simpler is the following:
Assumption 3. The social dissonance function, d(si, ·), is strictly decreasing in the num-
ber of concordant players until it reaches zero.
Example 1. A simple dissonance function is:
d(si, n) = M(si) ·max(0, 1− n
N¯
) (2.3)
This function is at its maximum for a given action when n = 0 and this maximum,
M(si) > 0, can be different for each action. Social dissonance decreases linearly in the
number of concordant agents until N¯ . If at least N¯ other agents have chosen the same
action as agent i, he experiences no social dissonance.
2.4 Two-Action Games
Two-action games, where each agent has a choice set Si = {A,B}, can be used to model
many yes/no decisions: whether to follow a social norm, express support for a policy, or
default on a loan.
6 d(si, N − 1) is the dissonance of choosing si when everyone else does and d(si, 0) is the dissonance of
being the only agent to choose action si.
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For each agent i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, let ∆ui := ui(B)− ui(A). Arrange the agents in order
of liking for B relative to A so that ∆ui is decreasing in i. There may be agents with
identical values of ∆ui.7
2.4.1 Supermodularity
Games with strategic complementarities are also refered to as supermodular games. The
key feature of these games is that agents’ utility functions exhibit increasing differences: the
relative benefit of choosing a “higher” action increases when the actions of other agents are
higher. Before formally defining increasing differences, the action space should be ordered.
Define an ordering on the actions in {A,B}: let B >i A for each i.8 Define the partial
ordering ≥ over action profiles player-wise: for s = (s1, s2, ..., sN ) and s′ = (s′1, s′2, ..., s′N ),
s ≥ s′ if si ≥i s′i for all i ∈ I. 9
Definition. An agent’s payoff function U i has increasing differences in si and s−i if
s′−i ≥ s−i implies
U i(B, s′−i)− U i(A, s′−i) ≥ U i(B, s−i)− U i(A, s−i) (2.4)
Proposition 1. Any finite-agent two-action social dissonance game is supermodular.
Proof. We need to show that condition (2.4) holds: each agent’s payoff function has in-
creasing differences in si and s−i. Suppose that s′−i ≥ s−i. If s′−i ≥ s−i then N(s′−i, B) ≥
N(s−i, B) and N(s′−i, A) ≤ N(s−i, A). Both d(A, ·) and d(B, ·) are nonincreasing in the
second argument, so
7 When there are some agents with identical ∆ui, it is useful to group them into types. Let there
be T ≤ N types or distinct values of ∆ui for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Label the types {1, 2, ..., T}, let the
numbers of agents of each type be N1, N2, ..., NT and let the differences in intrinsic utility for each type be
∆ut1 ,∆ut2 , ...,∆utT .
8 The ordering could also be A >i B and the game will still be supermodular. However, the increasing
differences property will not hold under a player-specific ordering where B >i A for some players and
A >i B for others. Keep in mind this is not a preference ordering.
9 Define an ordering on an arbitrary list of player actions in the same way. For example, with s−i =
(s1, s2, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sN ) and s′−i = (s′1, s′2, ..., s′i−1, s′i+1, ..., s′N ), s−i ≥ s′−i if sj ≥i s′j for all j ∈
{1, 2, ..., N} with j 6= i.
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d(B,N(s−i, B))− d(B,N(s′−i, B)) ≥ 0
and
d(A,N(s′−i, A))− d(A,N(s−i, A)) ≥ 0
Combining these two inequalities yields
d(B,N(s−i, B))− d(B,N(s′−i, B)) + d(A,N(s′−i, A))− d(A,N(s−i, A)) ≥ 0 (2.5)
After rearranging (2.5) and adding ui(B)− ui(A) to both sides, we obtain
ui(B)− d(B,N(s′−i, B))− [ui(A)− d(A,N(s′−i, A))] ≥
ui(B)− d(B,N(s−i, B))− [ui(A)− d(A,N(s−i, A))]. (2.6)
This is equivalent to U i(B, s′−i)− U i(A, s′−i) ≥ U i(B, s−i)− U i(A, s−i).
The supermodularity of two-action social dissonance games allows us to use the results
of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) to derive properties of the equilibrium set. Existence of
a pure-strategy equilibrium is guaranteed. Games which have a unique equilibrium are
dominance-solvable. With respect to the ordering of action profiles described in Proposi-
tion 10, supermodularity guarantees the existence of a largest and smallest equilibrium, as
well as monotonicity of the smallest and largest equilibria in response to changes in the
parameters of the payoff functions. Monotone comparative statics results are discussed
further in section 2.5.
2.4.2 Equilibria of Two-Action Games
Depending on the parameters {ui}Ni=0 and d, a social dissonance game may have differ-
ent equilibrium sets. In some games, there are monolithic equilibria: those where every
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agent chooses the same action, regardless of intrinsic preferences. There may be equilibria
where everyone feels free to act or express themselves in a way that reflects their intrinsic
preferences. Such an equilibrium is called true-to-type.
Definition. A true-to-type equilibrium is an equilibrium action profile s such that for each
i, if ∆ui > 0 then si = B and if ∆ui < 0 then si = A.
Those agents with ∆ui < 0 are type-a agents and those with ∆ui > 0 are type-b agents.
Agents who have ∆ui = 0 are indifferent, or type-0 agents, and may play either A or B
in a true-to-type equilibrium. Other equilibria are possible, but I first focus on identifying
conditions for monolithic and true-to-type equilibria.
For a monolithic-A to be an equilibrium, the intrinsic utility gain to any agent from
choosing B alone must not outweigh the additional social dissonance: ∆ui ≤ d(B, 0) for
all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. For monolithic-B to exist, −∆ui ≤ d(A, 0) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
Equivalently, we could just check these conditions for the extreme agents. Hence, for
monolithic-A to exist, it must be that
∆u1 ≤ d(B, 0) (2.7)
and for monolithic-B to exist,
−∆uN ≤ d(A, 0) (2.8)
In true-to-type equilibrium, the incremental benefit of playing one’s intrinsically preferred
action outweighs any incremental social dissonance cost from doing so. Indifferent agents
complicate matters in that they may be divided between actions A and B, but from each
indifferent agent’s perspective, the social dissonance of the other action must not be lower.
Let Na = #{i : ∆ui < 0}, Nb = #{i : ∆ui > 0}, and N0 = N−Na−Nb. There is a true-
to-type equilibrium if there exist non-negative integers NA0 and N
B
0 , with N
A
0 +N
B
0 = N0,
such that
−∆ui ≥ d(A,Na +NA0 − 1)− d(B,Nb +NB0 ) ∀i s.t. ∆ui < 0 (2.9)
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∆ui ≥ d(B,Nb +NB0 − 1)− d(A,Na +NA0 ) ∀i s.t. ∆ui > 0 (2.10)
d(B,Nb +N
B
0 ) ≥ d(A,Na +NA0 − 1) if NA0 > 0 (2.11)
d(A,Na +N
A
0 ) ≥ d(B,Nb +NB0 − 1) if NB0 > 0 (2.12)
Conditions (2.9) and (2.10) can be verified by simply checking that (2.9) holds for the
type-a with the least intense preference for A and (2.10) holds for the type-b with the
least intense preference for B. Conditions (2.11) and (2.12) are ignored when there are no
indifferent agents in the society.
Proposition 2 limits the set of equilibria by imposing a monotonicity requirement: If, in
equilibrium, agent i chooses an action that he intrinsically likes less than agent j does, then
agent j must also choose that action. The intuition behind the proof can be summarized
as follows: If some type-a’s choose B, it must be because the social dissonance of choosing
B is lower than the social dissonance of choosing A. Otherwise, these type-a’s would have
chosen A, their intrinsically preferred action. Now, with the social dissonance of B being
lower than A, type-b’s are doubly glad to choose B: it is intrinsically preferred and offers
lower social dissonance.
Proposition 2. (Monotonicity of Equilibrium Action Profile): Let s be an equilibrium
action profile. If for agents i and j, uj(si) − uj(ri) > ui(si) − ui(ri) for ri 6= si, then
sj = si.
Proof. Suppose there is a player i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} who chooses action si in equilibrium action
profile s and another player j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} such that uj(si)− uj(ri) > ui(si)− ui(ri). si
is a best response of i, so ui(si) − d(si, N(s−i, si)) ≥ ui(ri) − d(ri, N(s−i, ri)). It is easier
to proceed by writing this best-response condition as
ui(si)− ui(ri) ≥ d(si, N(s−i, si))− d(r,N(s−i, ri))
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Now, since player i is not counted in N(s−i, si) but will be counted in N(s−j , si), it must be
that N(s−j , si) ≥ N(s−i, si). We don’t know player j’s action yet; it might be counted in
N(s−i, ri) but won’t be counted in N(s−j , ri), so N(s−j , ri) ≤ N(s−i, ri). Given only that d
is non-increasing in its second argument, we know that d(si, N(s−j , si)) ≤ d(si, N(s−i, si))
and d(ri, N(s−j , ri)) ≥ d(ri, N(s−i, ri)). Combining these two inequalities, we have
d(si, N(s−i, si))− d(ri, N(s−i, ri)) ≥ d(si, N(s−j , si))− d(ri, N(s−j , ri))
Stringing together j’s stronger preference for si, i’s best-response condition, and this last
inequality concerning the social dissonance, we have
uj(si)− uj(ri) > d(si, N(s−j , si))− d(ri, N(s−j , ri))
which can be re-written to form j’s best-response condition.
Only si is a best-response for j.
Monotonicity diminishes the set of action profiles that are candidates for equilibria.
When all N agents have distinct ∆ui, there are N +1 candidates for equilibria, rather than
2N , which is the number of possible action profiles without the monotonicity restriction.
Monolithic-A and monolithic-B are possible equilibria, and can be checked with conditions
(2.7) and (2.8). The other candidates for equilibria are any “intermediate” action profiles10
where, with the agents in order of their preference for B from highest to lowest, si = B for
i ≤ k and si = A for i > k. To test whether each of these action profiles is an equilibrium,
we may just check the best-response conditions for the two marginal agents, k and k + 1.
The discussion in the previous paragraph addressed games in which agents are organized
in strictly descending order of their preference for B. There is the possibility that a group of
agents have the same ∆ui, but some choose A and some choose B. Asymmetric equilibria
have agents with the same intrinsic preferences choosing different actions. Monotonicity
10 True-to-type is a special case.
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rules out asymmetric behavior within more than one group of agents of the same ∆ui (see
Lemma 24 in the appendix). However, as Proposition 3 shows, if Assumption 3 holds, there
can be no asymmetric behavior in equilibrium within a group of agents with identical ∆ui
who are not intrinsically indifferent.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Let s be an equilibrium action profile. If
for agents i and j, ∆ui 6= 0, and uj(si)− uj(ri) ≥ ui(si)− ui(ri) for ri 6= si, then sj = si.
Proof. Proposition 2 states that, even without Assumption 3, if in equilibrium, uj(si) −
uj(ri) > ui(si) − ui(ri), then sj = si. I will prove by contradiction that for two agents i
and j with uj(B)− uj(A) = ui(B)− ui(A) 6= 0, in equilibrium s, it must be that sj = si.
Suppose to the contrary there is an equilibrium s and there are two agents i and j such
that ∆ui = ∆uj 6= 0, si = A, and sj = B.
A is a best response to s−i, and B is a best response to s−j . By definition of best response,
ui(A)− d(A,N(s−i, A)) ≥ ui(B)− d(B,N(s−i, B))
uj(A)− d(A,N(s−j , A)) ≤ uj(B)− d(B,N(s−j , B))
(2.13)
Rearranging these, we get
ui(A)− ui(B) ≥ d(A,N(s−i, A))− d(B,N(s−i, B))
uj(A)− uj(B) ≤ d(A,N(s−j , A))− d(B,N(s−j , B))
Since ∆uj = ∆ui,
d(A,N(s−j , A))− d(B,N(s−j , B)) ≥ d(A,N(s−i, A))− d(B,N(s−i, B))
which is to say
d(A,N(s−j , A))− d(A,N(s−i, A)) + [d(B,N(s−i, B))− d(B,N(s−j , B))] ≥ 0 (2.14)
N(s−i, A), the count of other agents from the perspective of i does not include i, but
N(s−j , A) does. Since agent j chose B, neither N(s−i, A) nor N(s−j , A) include j. Hence,
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N(s−j , A) > N(s−i, A). Likewise, N(s−i, B) > N(s−j , B). These last two inequalities
imply
d(A,N(s−j , A))− d(A,N(s−i, A)) ≤ 0
d(B,N(s−i, B))− d(B,N(s−j , B)) ≤ 0
due to the non-decreasing nature of the social dissonance functions.
Under Assumption 3, either these inequalities are strict, which contradicts (2.14), or
the social dissonance is zero. If social dissonance is zero, (2.13) implies ui(A) ≥ ui(B) and
uj(A) ≤ uj(B). Since ui(A) − ui(B) = uj(A) − uj(B), it must be that both equal zero.
However, this contradicts the assumption that ∆ui 6= 0 and ∆uj 6= 0.
Example 2 in 2.6.1 illustrates that an asymmetric equilibrium may exist without As-
sumption 3, and the discussion in 2.6.2 addresses asymmetric behavior within a group of
intrinsically indifferent agents. The multiplicity of equilibria due to asymmetry among
indifferent agents suggests the potential for a coordination problem with welfare implica-
tions. The Dixit game in 2.6.3 is an example of a game where every agent has different
intrinsic preferences.
2.5 Comparative Statics
Action profiles are ordered according to the partial order ≥ defined before Proposition
1. The lowest action profile is monolithic-A, and the highest is monolithic-B. Under As-
sumption 3, the set of (pure-strategy) equilibria of a social dissonance game can be any
non-empty subset of the monotone action profiles. An increase in an equilibrium set is an
increase, with respect to the order ≥, of either the lowest equilibrium, the highest equilib-
rium, or both. In other words, an increase is a shift toward profiles where more agents play
action B. A decrease in an equilibrium set is defined conversely as a shift toward profiles
where more agents play A.
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Define the vector ∆u := (∆ui)Ni=1 and let ∆d := (∆dn)
N−1
n=0 be a vector of differences in
social dissonance between action A and action B faced by an agent when n other agents
choose B. That is, ∆dn = d(A,N − 1− n)− d(B,n) for n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}. Recall from
observing the best response condition (2.2) that the equilibrium set depends on ∆u and ∆d.
The effects of changes in these parameters are verified separately. Proposition 4 shows that
a shift in the intrinsic utility vector, ∆u, toward one action will be accompanied by a shift
in the equilibrium set toward the same action. Proposition 6 shows that the equilibrium
set changes monotonically when there is an overall change in the social dissonance for one
action relative to the other.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium set of a social dissonance game is non-decreasing in ∆u.
Proof. Theorem 6 and its corollary in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) state that a family of
supermodular games, such as two-action social dissonance games, with payoff functions
that have an additional increasing differences property with respect to some exogenous
parameter (∆u), has equilibrium sets that are non-decreasing in ∆u. This increasing
differences property is described and verified in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. For all i, U i has increasing differences in si and ∆u for any fixed s−i.
Proof. One only must verify that, for any fixed s−i, the difference U i(B, s−i)− U i(A, s−i)
is increasing in ∆u.
U i(B, s−i)− U i(A, s−i) = ui(B)− d(B,N(s−i, B))− (ui(A)− d(A,N(s−i, A)))
= (ui(B)− (ui(A))− (d(B,N(s−i, B))− d(A,N(s−i, A)))
= ∆ui + (d(A,N(s−i, A))− d(B,N(s−i, B)))
An increase in ∆ui clearly increases U i(B, s−i)−U i(A, s−i), while any increase in ∆uj for
j 6= i has no effect. Hence, U i(B, s−i)− U i(A, s−i) is increasing in ∆u.
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Proposition 6. The equilibrium set of a social dissonance game is non-decreasing in ∆d.
Proof. As with Proposition 4, the result follows from Theorem 6 in Milgrom and Roberts
after verifying that U i has increasing differences in si and ∆d for any fixed s−i. The analog
to the equation in Lemma 5 is
U i(B, s−i)− U i(A, s−i) = ui(B)− d(B, s−i)− (ui(A)− d(A, s−i))
= ui(B)− ui(A) + (d(A, s−i)− d(B, s−i))
= ui(B)− ui(A) + (d(A,N(s−i, A))− d(B,N(s−i, B)))
= ui(B)− ui(A) + (d(A,N − 1−N(s−i, B))− d(B,N(s−i, B)))
= ui(B)− ui(A) + ∆d(N(s−i, B))
The equilibrium set varies in a nondecreasing manner with any increase in ∆d. This increase
in ∆d could be any change in the dissonance function from d to d′ where d′(A,n) ≥ d(A,n)
for all n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1} and d′(B,n) ≤ d(B,n) for all n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}, or any
change from d to d′ that makes A worse relative to B in terms of social dissonance for a
fixed action profile of other agents.
2.6 Example Games
The examples that follow are included to provide a demonstration of the general results on
the characterization of equilibrium and comparative statics. They may be used to quickly
model common situations in which social dissonance is a factor. Because these examples
are intended to stand alone and provide ready-made solutions, some of the results may
seem repetitive of those from earlier sections.
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2.6.1 Game with Two Types
Imagine an issue on which society is divided into two camps of agents with identical pref-
erences, all of whom are forced to choose between A and B. In this society, Na of the
agents are of type-a and intrinsically like action A better, while Nb, or N − Na, of the
agents are of type-b and intrinsically like action B better. The intrinsic utility functions
for the two types, ua and ub, are such that ua(A) > ua(B) and ub(B) > ub(A). Let
∆ua := ua(A)− ua(B) and ∆ub := ub(B)− ub(A) be the gaps in intrinsic utility between
the preferred action and non-preferred action for type-a and type-b agents. The game is
thus defined by {Na, Nb,∆ua,∆ub, d}.
Monolithic-A is an equilibrium if and only if ∆ub ≤ d(B, 0) and monolithic-B is an
equilibrium if and only if ∆ua ≤ d(A, 0). There exists a true-to-type equilibrium if
∆ua ≥ d(A,Na − 1)− d(B,Nb) (2.15)
and
∆ub ≥ d(B,Nb − 1)− d(A,Na) (2.16)
Due to the supermodularity of the game, it has at least one pure-strategy equilibrium
for arbitrary parameters. It is also possible to prove the existence of a pure-strategy equi-
librium by verifying that either the true-to-type conditions or at least one of the monolithic
equilibrium conditions will always hold. This proof is outlined in Appendix A.
From Proposition 2 it follows that if, in equilibrium some agents of one type play
against-type, then all agents of the other type play true-to-type. Precluded as equilibria
are any action profiles where both types choose against type, there is asymmetry within
both types, or one type behaves asymmetrically and the other chooses against type.
When Assumption 3 holds, the set of candidates for equilibria is limited to monolithic-
A, true-to-type, and monolithic-B. The equilibrium set can be any non-empty subset of
the three candidate equilibria, depending on the parameters of the game.
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This raises the question of whether members of the same group may choose different
actions in equilibrium. An asymmetric equilibrium can exist if Assumption 3 does not
hold, as the following example illustrates.
Example 2. Suppose a society has Na = 5 and Nb = 5. Suppose ∆u
a = 0.5, ∆ub = 2 and
the social dissonance function is decreasing, but not strictly. d is such that d(·, 0) = 1 and
if 2 ≤ n ≤ 4, d(A,n) = 0.75 and d(B,N−n−1) = 0.25. Type-b’s have a dominant strategy
of choosing B. If there is asymmtery within type-a, with 3 choosing A and 2 choosing B,
a type-a agent who chooses A sees 2 others choosing A and 7 others choosing B. A type-a
who chooses B sees 3 others choosing A and 6 others choosing B. The payoffs to the type-a’s
are 0.5 − 0.75 for choosing A and 0 − 0.25 for B. There is no incentive for any individual
to choose otherwise; the action profile described is an asymmetric equilibrium.
When a game has a unique monolithic equilibrium, the players who are choosing against
their intrinsic preferences can be said to be “entrapped.” Conditions for this are generalized
in section 2.7, but the idea is that one type of player has strong enough preferences to
overcome any possible social dissonance, and the other type does not represent enough of
the population to reduce social dissonance to a comfortable level. In games with a unique
true-to-type equilibrium, none of the agents care enough about social dissonance for it to
have any effect on their decisions.
Games that have multiple equilibria, especially those with all three, suggest the need
for welfare analysis and a coordination device to ensure that agents settle on the best
equilibrium. For example, if true-to-type is an equilibrium and it Pareto-dominates11 the
two monolithic equilibria, then a government may wish to signal to agents in a way that
would induce them to choose according to intrinsic preferences.
In the notation of the comparative statics result, Proposition 4, changes in the popu-
lation are a shift in ∆ui. In the two-type game, replacing a type-a player i with a type-b
player is the same as increasing ∆ui from −∆ua to ∆ub. Increasing ∆ub or decreasing
11 Action profile s Pareto dominates s′ if U i(s) ≥ U i(s′)∀i and U i(s) > U i(s′) for at least one i.
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∆ua would also be represented as increases in ∆ui. All of these changes would lead to
non-decreasing shifts12 in the equilibrium set.
Non-monotonic changes in the dissonance function can affect the equilibrium set. In
the following example, a change from d to d′ where d′ ≥ d, removes true-to-type from the
equilibrium set.
Example 3. Suppose in the two-type game, Na = 15 and Nb = 5. Let ∆u
a = ∆ub = 0.5
and let d(si, n) = max(0, 1− n
6
). The equilibria are monolithic-A, monolithic-B, and true-
to-type. Now, if instead, the dissonance function is d′(si, n) = 2 · max(0, 1 − n
6
), only
monolithic-A and monolithic-B are equilibria.
Increasing the entire social dissonance function in a multiplicative manner is repre-
sentative of an institution that discourages diversity and nonconformity in general. In
societies like the one in Example 3 where the population is unbalanced, such a change in
the institution is more likely to be eliminate true-to-type from the equilibrium set.
2.6.2 Game with Two Types and Indifferent Agents
Elections and opinion polls on important issues often force citizens to choose between one
of two alternatives. Voters are allowed to abstain and poll respondents are allowed to say
they are indifferent, but a citizen who is intrinsically indifferent may choose one way or
another due to some perceived pressure to make a clear choice. It is also possible that the
citizen’s mood, the ordering of the alternatives, or some other random factor can sway his
vote to either side of the fence. The opinions and votes of these indifferent citizens can
change the course of history.
To investigate the effect of forced decisions by indifferent agents on the payoffs to others,
include a third type of agent, the type-0. These agents decide solely on the basis of social
dissonance concerns. Suppose there are Na agents of type-a, Nb type-b agents, and N0
type-0 agents. The game is described by (Na, Nb, N0,∆u
a,∆ub, d).
12 The order of equilibria, from lowest to highest, is monolithic-A, true-to-type, monolithic-B.
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Proposition 2 restricts the set of action profiles that may be equilibria. In particular,
if there is an agent of type-0 who chooses A in equilibrium, than all type-a agents must
choose A; if there is a type-0 agent who chooses B, then all type-b’s choose B. 13
In order to have a true-to-type equilibrium, there must exist non-negative integers NA0 and
NB0 , with N
A
0 +N
B
0 = N0, such that
∆ua ≥ d(A,Na +NA0 − 1)− d(B,Nb +NB0 ) (2.17)
∆ub ≥ d(B,Nb +NB0 − 1)− d(A,Na +NA0 ) (2.18)
d(B,Nb +N
B
0 ) ≥ d(A,Na +NA0 − 1)
}
if NA0 > 0 (2.19)
d(A,Na +N
A
0 ) ≥ d(B,Nb +NB0 − 1)
}
if NB0 > 0 (2.20)
As in the two-type game, if ∆ub ≤ d(B, 0), monolithic-A is an equilibrium and if ∆ua ≤
d(A, 0), monolithic-B is an equilibrium.
In equilibrium, there can be asymmetric behavior among type-0 agents. If Assumption 3
is imposed, we can limit the set of asymmetric equilibria to consider. If type-a and type-b
both choose true-to-type, type-0 choices in equilibrium can be asymmetric, but this requires
that social dissonance is zero for both actions.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 3, if action profile s is an equilibrium where type-0
agents behave asymmetrically, then under s, social dissonance must be zero for all agents.
13 If type-b chooses A in equilibrium, then that equilibrium is monolithic-A. If type-a chooses B, that
equilibrium is monolithic-B.
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Proof. Suppose in equilibrium there is asymmetric behavior within the group of type-0
agents, withNA0 choosing A andN
B
0 choosing B. TheNa type-a’s choose A and theNb type-
b’s choose B. The condition for a type-0 to choose A is d(A,Na+N
A
0 −1) ≤ d(B,Nb+NB0 ).
The condition for a type-0 to choose B is d(B,Nb + N
B
0 − 1) ≤ d(A,Na + NA0 ). By
monotonicity of d, d(A,Na+N
A
0 −1) ≥ d(A,Na+NA0 ) and d(B,Nb+NB0 −1) ≥ d(B,Nb+
NB0 ). Stringing these together, we have
d(B,Nb+N
B
0 ) ≥ d(A,Na+NA0 −1) ≥ d(A,Na+NA0 ) ≥ d(B,Nb+NB0 −1) ≥ d(B,Nb+NB0 )
which implies that all of these are equal. Since d is strictly decreasing until it reaches zero,
d(A,Na +N
A
0 − 1) = d(A,Na +NA0 ) implies that dissonance must be zero.
With type-0 agents in a society, finding all equilibria is more complicated than just checking
the list of sufficient conditions starting with (2.17). First, check to see if the conditions
for monolithic equilibria are satisfied. Next, use the true-to-type conditions to test for the
two equilibria where type-a plays A, type-b plays B, and type-0’s either all play A or all
play B. Finally, use proposition 7 to find the asymmetric equilibria with the minimum and
maximum number of type-0’s playing A.
Example 4. Suppose Na = Nb = N0 = 10. Let ∆u
a = ∆ub = 0.5 and let d(si, n) =
max(0, 1− n
12
). There are monolithic-A and monolithic-B equilibria, since ∆ub ≤ d(B, 0)
and ∆ua ≤ d(A, 0). There are two true-to-type equilibria where all type-0’s coordinate on
either action. Finally, there are true-to-type equilibria where type-0’s behave asymmetri-
cally. By Proposition 7, social dissonance must be zero for both actions, so there must be
at least three type-0 agents playing either action.
The society described in the example above is one where all of the true-to-type equilibria
Pareto-dominate the monolithic equilibria. Note also that in Example 4, the equilibria
where type-0 agents behave asymmetrically all Pareto-dominate the equilibria where type-
0’s all choose the same action. This suggests that society would benefit from a coordination
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device so the indifferent agents divide into two groups: some who choose A and some who
choose B.
2.6.3 Dixit Game
N players must each decide whether to maintain status quo (action A) or join a club
(action B). Joining the “club” can represent adoption of a new technology or standard, or
the holding of a progressive opinion on an issue. Suppose the gap in intrinsic utility between
B and A decreases linearly with player type, i, which runs from 1 to N. Set ui(B) = α−βi
and ui(A) = 0, so ∆ui := ui(B)− ui(A) is equal to α− βi . Suppose the social dissonance
is also linear. The social dissonance function is
d(A,n) = γ(N − 1− n)
d(B,n) = τ(N − 1− n)
(2.21)
The intrinsic utility functions and the dissonance functions together give the payoffs:
U i(A, s−i) = −γ(N − 1−N(s−i, A))
U i(B, s−i) = α− βi− τ(N − 1−N(s−i, B))
β, γ, τ > 0
(2.22)
By condition (2.7), monolithic-A is an equilibrium if α−β ≤ τ(N −1). By condition (2.8),
monolithic-B is an equilibrium if βN − α ≤ γ(N − 1). Other equilibria are possible, and
will obey the monotonicity property described in Proposition 2.
Comparative statics follow from the results of section 2.5. An increase in α will lead
to a shift in the equilibrium set toward action profiles where more agents play B, while an
increase in β will shift the equilibrium set toward action A. Increasing γ or decreasing τ
increases the social dissonance of A relative to B and will lead to a shift in the equilibrium
set toward profiles where B is played by more agents.
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2.7 Cascades and Entrapment
In some social dissonance games, the choices of the agents who have the most intense
intrinsic preferences set off a cascade of externalities that lead other agents to favor joining
them. This cascade continues until all agents are convinced to join, due to the increasing
social dissonance cost of choosing otherwise.
A cascade equilibrium is a monolithic equilibrium in a dominance-solvable game. It
follows from the definition of dominance solvability that a cascade equilibrium is unique.
In supermodular games, uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium guarantees dominance
solvability (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). However, uniqueness alone does not define a
cascade equilibrium; a true-to-type equilibrium may be the unique solution from iterated
elimination of strongly dominated actions.
I discuss conditions for establishing monolithic-B as a cascade equilibrium, but this
can easily be applied to the case where monolithic-A is the only equilibrium. Recall that
monolithic-B is an equilibrium if no one gains enough intrinsic utility from A to overcome
the dissonance of choosing it alone: ∀i, d(A, 0) > −∆ui.
In order to preclude the monolithic-A equilibrium, there must be an agent for whom B
is a strictly dominant strategy. That is, for some agent i it must be that ui(B)−d(B, 0) >
ui(A) − d(A,N − 1). Since d(A,N − 1) = 0 and the players are arranged in decreasing
order of preference for A, this is
∆u1 > d(B, 0) (2.23)
There must also be a similar condition for the rest of the agents that leads to the cascade
into monolithic-B. Knowing that there is a agent (i = 1) that will always choose B, the
agent with the next-strongest preference for B must find B to be a dominant strategy.
The cascade of iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions continues until all agents,
including those who most strongly prefer A, are convinced to play B to avoid the social
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dissonance of choosing A. This second condition is ∀i ∈ {2, 3, ..., N},
∆ui > d(B, i− 1)− d(A,N − 1− i) (2.24)
From these conditions follow the sufficient conditions for monolithic-B to be a cascade
equilibrium established in Dixit (2003) for the game in section 2.6.3: (1) there exists a
player whose preference for B is strong enough to overcome the social dissonance of being
the only member of the club. (2) The marginal player-to-player decrease in strength of
preference for B is less the marginal reduction in social dissonance of choosing B when an
additional player joins. 14 Dixit’s second condition is stronger than necessary, because
it is the sum of marginal dissonance that matters in condition (2.24).
Example 5. Suppose there are four agents in a society and the social dissonance function
is d(si, n) = 1− n
N − 1. One agent has a preference for B that is intense enough to overcome
any social dissonance concerns (∆u1 = 1.5), two agents have a less intense preference for B
(∆u2 = ∆u3 = 0.75), and one agent prefers A (∆u4 = −0.75). In this society, monolithic-B
is a cascade equilibrium.
The sufficient conditions (2.23) and (2.24) for monolithic-B to be a cascade equilibrium in
the static simultaneous-move game are also sufficient for a subgame perfect equilibrium in
a sequential version of the game to result in monolithic-B. 15 To see why this is true,
consider an extensive form game with N players, 16 each of whom moves exactly once in
an arbitrary order. Information is perfect and complete.
Supposing condition (2.23) holds, player 1 will always choose B. That is, paths in the
game tree in which player 1 chooses A will not be played in equilibrium. If player 1 moves
last, then player 2 will by backward induction, realize that B will be chosen, and due to
(2.24) only B as the best response. If player 1 moves before player 2, then player 2 again
14 Consistent with the specification in 2.6.3, this is (1)α− βi > τ(N − 1) and (2) β < γ + τ .
15 Dixit (2003) has a similar result.
16 This can be generalized to a game with replicants.
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chooses B as a best response. Players 3 through N will in turn be subject to the same
logic, and cascade into monolithic-B follows as the only equilibrium outcome.
2.7.1 Entrapment
There are equilibria in which some agents would be better off if others chose differently, but
are “entrapped” into choosing an action they do not intrinsically prefer.17 In Example 5,
monolithic-B is an entrapment for agent 4. This concept of entrapment can be generalized
to include any action profile where at least one agent is negatively affected by the social
dissonance of others’ choices. Even a true-to-type equilibrium may be an entrapment, if it
is not the best outcome for some of the players.
Definition. Action profile s is an entrapment for player i if there is another action profile
sˆ such that U i(sˆ) > U i(s).
Finding such an sˆ that is a candidate for improvement is easy: choose the profile that is
monolithic in i’s intrinsically preferred action. This will maximize i’s payoff since ui is
maximized and d evaluates to zero.
Lemma 8. For any non-true-to-type action profile, there is an agent i for whom a mono-
lithic profile of i’s intrinsically preferred action is strictly better.
Proof. Suppose s is not a true-to-type action profile. There is an agent i for whom
ui(si) < ui(ri) where ri is the other action in i’s choice set. Let sˆ be the monolithic
action profile where for all j, sˆj = ri. d(ri, N(sˆ−i, ri)) = 0 and d(si, N(s−i, si)) ≥ 0.
ui(ri)− d(ri, N(sˆ−i, r)) > ui(si)− d(si, N(s−i, si)), which is to say U i(sˆ) > U i(s).
Monolithic-B is an entrapment for agents with ∆ui < 0 but is optimal for agents with
∆ui > 0. In order for this to be the result of a cascade (and satisfy the cascade conditions),
17 Dixit(2003) describes entrapment as “the result that everyone joins a club which several members
may continue to dislike.”
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the dissonance of choosing B as part of a minority must be less than the dissonance of
choosing A as a member of the majority.
When the dissonance associated with action A is large relative to the dissonance of
B, a small group of people with intense preferences for B can pressure a majority with a
less intense preference for A. Examining the cascade condition again, if more than half of
society is entrapped in the monolithic-B cascade equilibrium, there is a agent i < N/2 for
whom ∆ui > d(B, i− 1)− d(A,N − i).
2.8 Games with More than Two Actions
Games with two actions allow us to study choices in many settings, but in others, there
are more than two actions available. In opinion polls and voting, citizens may be faced
with a choice between two salient candidates or viewpoints, and a third option to abstain
from expressing an opinion or casting a vote.
In general, social dissonance games with more than two actions are not supermodular.
To see this, consider a game with three actions, {A,B,C} with an arbitrary ordering
A > B > C. If, as before, social dissonance results from any discordant action, there
may or may not be an incremental benefit to raising one’s action from C. If a group of
other agents increase their actions from B to A, this reduces the dissonance and thereby
increases the incremental benefit of increasing one’s action from C to A. However, an agent
considering an increase from C to B may now face a greater level of dissonance and, hence,
a lower incremental benefit.
Games that are supermodular are guaranteed to have pure strategy equilibria and
monotone comparative statics properties. Games which are not supermodular may still
have pure strategy equilibria, but additional analysis would be needed to identify them.
The examples that follow are supermodular three-action games.
Example 6. Consider a situation where citizens are asked for their opinions on an election
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or actually vote, knowing that they may be asked later about their choices.18 Suppose
now that those who choose one of two frontrunners will face dissonance from those who do
not, and those who choose a third-party candidate or otherwise abstain from choosing one
of the frontrunners will experience no social dissonance.19
The dissonance functions for A, M, and B follow the form:
d(A, s−i) = d(A,N(s−i, A))
d(M, s−i) = 0
d(B, s−i) = d(B,N(s−i, B))
(2.25)
where d(A, ·) and d(B, ·) are decreasing in their arguments.
If s′−i > s−i, then N(s′−i, A) ≤ N(s−i, A) and N(s′−i, B) ≥ N(s−i, B). It follows that
d(A, s′−i) ≥ d(A, s−i) and d(B, s−i) ≤ d(B, s′−i). As specified, d(M, s′−i) = d(M, s−i).
There are three basic categories of increases in the actions of others: a group of agents
can shift from A to B, from A to M, or from B to M. Isolating a single category of others’
increase in action allows us to separately consider its effect on the incremental benefit of a
single agent’s increase in action. In order for the increasing differences property to hold in
general, any increase in an agent’s own action must be more beneficial when there is any
category of increase in others’ actions. The differences in the incremental benefit for each
18 DellaVigna, List, Malmendier and Rao (2013) find there is a cost associated with both not voting and
lying about one’s choice after voting.
19 The description can be generalized to assign a constant level of dissonance to those who choose neither
of the frontrunners. Having zero social dissonance is consistent with Assumption 5.
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possible increase in an agent’s own action are
U i(M, s′−i)− U i(A, s′−i)−[U i(M, s−i)− U i(A, s−i)]
= d(M, s−i)− d(M, s′−i) + d(A, s′−i)− d(A, s−i)
U i(B, s′−i)− U i(M, s′−i)−[U i(B, s−i)− U i(M, s−i)]
= d(B, s−i)− d(B, s′−i) + d(M, s′−i)− d(M, s−i)
U i(B, s′−i)− U i(A, s′−i)−[U i(B, s−i)− U i(A, s−i)]
= d(B, s−i)− d(B, s′−i) + d(A, s′−i)− d(A, s−i)
(2.26)
It follows from the specification in (2.25) that d(M, s−i)−d(M, s′−i) = 0; thus, the expres-
sions in (2.26) are non-negative. Hence, under the ordering of actions, B > M > A, with a
dissonance function following the form of (2.25), the payoff functions U i exhibit increasing
differences in si and s−i and the game is supermodular.20
Example 7. Suppose that in the example above that citizens choosing one of the fron-
trunners only experience social dissonance from people choosing the other frontrunner.
d(A, s−i) = d(A,N(s−i, A) +N(s−i,M))
d(M, s−i) = 0
d(B, s−i) = d(B,N(s−i, B) +N(s−i,M))
(2.27)
where d(A, ·) and d(B, ·) are decreasing in their arguments.
Payoffs in three-action games with this type of dissonance function also have increasing
differences in own and others’ actions. Therefore, such games are supermodular.
Example 8. Consider an election with three candidates or an issue with three leading
perspectives, A, M, and B. Citizens who choose A face social dissonance from those who
20 Supermodularity also holds under the ordering A > M > B.
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choose otherwise, but citizens who choose M or B tolerate one another and only face
dissonance from those who choose A.
d(A, s−i) = d(A,N(s−i, A)
d(M, s−i) = d(M,N(s−i, B) +N(s−i,M))
d(B, s−i) = d(B,N(s−i, B) +N(s−i,M))
(2.28)
where d(A, ·), d(M, ·), and d(B, ·) are decreasing in their arguments. If we add to the
specification that d(M, ·) = d(B, ·), then the game is supermodular.
2.9 Conclusion
Social dissonance games provide a framework for examining the effects of institutions and
individuals’ intrinsic preferences in situations where the conformity motive is present. Equi-
libria must obey a monotonicity property: if one agent chooses an action, any agent who
intrinsically likes the action more will also choose it. Two-action social dissonance games
are supermodular. As such, we can apply the results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) to
generate clear qualitative predictions of how the equilibrium set will change. More spe-
cific information about agents’ intrinsic values or the functional form of the dissonance
function21 allow for identification of the equilibrium set.
There can be multiple equilibria in a social dissonance game. Without a clear signal
about the intentions of others, individuals in a society may fail to coordinate on the choices
they intrinsically prefer. A monolithic equilibrium may be good for one subgroup, but the
true-to-type equilibrium is not necessarily worse for them if social dissonance is eliminated
at an agreement level well below 100%. In such cases, encouraging true-to-type behavior
maximizes overall welfare. Managing the behavior of indifferent agents can help to avoid a
suboptimal outcome22 and entrapment of those holding a minority opinion. In the case
21 See my Example 2.3.
22 See Example 4 in section 2.6.2.
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of aggressive changes in institutions, reducing social dissonance for marginalized citizens
may also help to improve overall welfare.
Not all instances of social dissonance are counterproductive to progress. Governments
can use social dissonance as a lever to change social norms. An otherwise expensive in-
centive program can be made more affordable by paying only some individuals to change
behavior, then allowing the conformity motive to influence others to change. If, on the
other hand, social contagion starts to become a problem, an institution may respond by
raising social dissonance associated with the contagious action.
The model in this paper can be extended to dynamic games with imperfect information.
We should note that misinformation and its distortion of social dissonance can slow down
the process of a change in a social norm. A 2013 Gallup poll found that despite majority
support for the legalization of same-sex marriage, 63% of respondents believed that the
majority opposed legalization. Transparency of opinions will likely lead to a further shift in
opinions to the point where a greater percentage of the population supports the legalization
of same-sex marriage.
Chapter 3
Social Dissonance in a Model with
a Continuum of Agents
3.1 Introduction
Social dissonance games can be used to model situations where the conformity motive
affects individual decision-making. This includes responses to opinion polls, social behavior,
and choices in markets. In a previous essay, I defined static social dissonance games with a
finite number of agents and characterized the equilibria that could arise in such games with
two actions. The finite-agent model is fitting when there are a small number of agents who
are all aware of each other’s actions, but when the population becomes larger and agents
are only aware of actions on the aggregate level, a model with a continuum of agents in
the style developed by Aumann (1964) is more appropriate.
In this paper, I define social dissonance games with a continuum of agents and char-
acterize their equilibrium sets. Equilibrium action profiles are monotone in the sense that
the group of players who choose a particular action are those with the strongest intrinsic
preference for that action. In a continuum-of-agents model, each individual agent has no
effect on the behavior of other agents. As a consequence of this, asymmetric behavior may
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be part of an equilibrium, even within a group of agents with a clear intrinsic preference
for one action over the other.1 A group of “sell-outs” going against their intrinsic pref-
erences, with an inability to make a coordinated change, can hold in place a norm they do
not favor.
Two-action social dissonance games belong to a larger class, supermodular games, which
have been studied by Topkis (1979), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), and Yang
and Qi (2013). They are also a subclass of aggregative games, as studied by Acemoglu and
Jensen (2010). In two-action social dissonance games, the set of equilibria depends only on
each player’s difference in utility between the two actions, and the difference in dissonance
between the two actions for each aggregate action profile. I use the results of Yang and Qi
to establish monotone comparative statics for equilibrium sets with respect to changes in
intrinsic utilities and dissonance functions.
The framework of social dissonance games can be used in empirical studies of how
changes in institutions - messages from media, lawmakers, and leaders - affect aggregate
behavior. I provide some examples of how to compute equilibria for two-action games
with dissonance functions and distributions of intrinsic utilities that are “manageable.”
For instance, if dissonance is linearly decreasing in level of agreement and intrinsic utility
is linearly distributed across the population, there is a single equilibrium, described by
a threshold agent. This threshold agent corresponds to a split in the behavior of the
population into two groups that each choose one of the two actions.
This essay is organized as follows: In section 3.2, I describe the general class of social
dissonance games with a continuum of agents. Section 3.3 begins the study of two-action
games, and section 3.4 discusses some examples and the computation of their equilibria.
Section 3.5 introduces games in which dissonance decreases linearly, and section 3.6 suggests
uses for this specification in an empirical setting. Section 3.7 discusses dynamic games.
Section 3.8 concludes.
1 An asymmetric action profile is one in which agents with the same intrinic utilities for the actions
choose different pure strategies.
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3.2 The Model
The set of agents, I, is represented by the closed unit interval [0, 1], endowed with Lebesgue
measure µ. The agents have a common finite action set C and the joint action space S is
the set of measurable functions from [0, 1] to C. For any action profile s ∈ S, the action
of player i given by s(i). The measure of agents choosing action c ∈ C in profile s is
µs(c) := µ{i : s(i) = c}.2
Each agent i ∈ [0, 1] has an intrinsic utility function ui : C → R and all agents share
the same social dissonance function d : C × [0, 1]→ R which takes as arguments a player’s
own action and the measure of agents choosing that action. The payoff to agent i, U i, is
determined by the intrinsic utility of his own action and the social dissonance associated
with the measure of agents choosing this same action.
U i(s) = ui(s(i))− d(s(i), µs(s(i))) (3.1)
A technical assumption is required: the intrinsic utilities of the players must be distributed
in such a way we can determine the measure of players in [0, 1] with an intrinsic utility for
a given action that is above a minimum level. This also allows us to measure the set of
players who intrinsically prefer one action over another.
Assumption 4. For each action c ∈ C and each a ∈ R, the set {i ∈ [0, 1] : ui(c) > a} is
measurable.
3.2.1 Dissonance Functions
A dissonance function represents the institution, or exogenous code of conduct, imposed
on a society of agents. For each action, the dissonance function defines the psychic cost
of each level of agreement with one’s action. We might imagine that when a leader makes
a statement in support of an action, the dissonance function for that action decreases.
2 If there are N actions in C, µs can be seen as an N-dimensional vector of the measures of agents
choosing each action.
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Even if the choices of others remained the same, there is a reduction in the legitimacy of
peer disapproval and the negative emotion associated with choosing the leader-supported
action. Conversely, if more messages from the media and government express a negative
stance on a behavior, the dissonance function for the action increases, and peer disapproval
is consequently harsher for each level of agreement.3
Regardless of the institution, when there is full agreement with others, there is no social
dissonance associated with an action. For a fixed dissonance function, as more agents agree
with one’s own action, the frequency of disapproval (actual or imagined) decreases. It is
assumed that there will not be any discrete jumps in the psychic cost of dissonance as
a function of the level of agreement. Assumptions 5 and 6 are imposed throughout the
paper. The decreasing nature of d and its continuity on [0, 1] guarantees that it attains its
maximum for each action when the second argument is zero.
Assumption 5. d(c, 1) = 0 for all c ∈ C.
Assumption 6. For each c ∈ C, d(c, ·) is non-negative, continuous, and weakly decreasing
in the measure of other agents choosing the player’s own action.
We may also impose an additional assumption, that there are no “plateaus” in the graph
of the dissonance function until dissonance is reduced to zero. This is both logical and
convenient.
Assumption 7. For all c ∈ C, d(c, ·) is strictly decreasing in the second argument until
reaching zero.
The three assumptions above allow for flexibility in the agreement level at which dis-
sonance is eliminated. The dissonance elimination level may depend on the particular
decision or market being studied. For instance, if being in the majority can make an in-
dividual impervious to the presence of disagreement, the dissonance elimination level is
0.5.
3 Diekmann, Przepiorka, and Rauhut (2011) suggests there is a limit to this. A dissonance function can
be specified such that minimal dissonance is achieved even without full agreement on one’s chosen action.
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3.2.2 Nash Equilibrium
Action s(i) ∈ C is a best response to the actions of the other agents, s\s(i), if for all
c ∈ C, ui(s(i)) − d(s(i), µs(s(i))) ≥ ui(c) − d(c, µs(c)). A Nash Equilibrium is an action
profile, s, where every agent’s action is a best response to the actions of the other agents.4
In this paper, I focus exclusively on pure strategy equilibria.
Payoff functions are continuous in a player’s own action and in the actions of others,
and the set {i ∈ [0, 1] : U i(c, s) > U i(c′, s)} is measurable for all c, c′ ∈ C and s ∈ S. These
properties and the fact that the dissonance function depends only on the measure, not the
names, of the concordant agents allow us to apply Theorem 2 from Schmeidler (1973) to
guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.5
3.3 Two-Action Games
Suppose the choice set consists of only two actions, A and B. Let ∆ui = ui(B) − ui(A).
Assume the agents are arranged on [0, 1] in decreasing order of ∆ui.6 Throughout the
rest of this paper, a player’s ∆ui serves as his type.
Theorem 9. (Monotonicity) Suppose s∗ is an equilibrium. If j is such that uj(s∗(i)) −
uj(c) > ui(s∗(i))− ui(c) for c 6= s∗(i) then s∗(j) = s∗(i).
Proof. Let µs∗(A) and µs∗(B) be the measure of agents who play A and B in s
∗. Suppose
that s∗(i) = B. This is a best response because s∗ is an equilibrium. It must be that
ui(B)− d(B,µs∗(B)) ≥ ui(A)− d(A,µs∗(A)) and hence,
ui(B)− ui(A) ≥ d(B,µs∗(B))− d(A,µs∗(A)) (3.2)
4 Others in the literature, including Schmeidler, define Nash equilibrium by allowing a measure-zero set
of agents to deviate from the best response, so almost every agent is best-responding. Since actions of a
measure-zero set of agents do not affect payoffs, there is no substantive different between the two definitions.
5 For another approach to establishing existence of a pure strategy equilibrium (where all agents are
best-responding with a pure strategy), see Yang and Qi (2013).
6 This ordering must be preserved to apply the results of Yang and Qi on monotone equilibria and
comparative statics.
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If uj(B)− uj(A) > ui(B)− ui(A) then
uj(B)− uj(A) > d(B,µs∗(B))− d(A,µs∗(A)) (3.3)
and only B is a best response for agent j, so s∗(j) = B for all such j.
There is an analogous argument for the case when s∗(i) = A and there is an agent j with
uj(A)− uj(B) > ui(A)− ui(B).
From Theorem 9, we know that if ∆ui is strictly decreasing7 in i, equilibria are strictly
monotone: if agent i ∈ [0, 1] chooses B then so does any agent j < i, and if i chooses A then
so does any j > i. Thus, if ∆ui is strictly decreasing in i, we can describe each equilibrium
by a threshold agent, i∗. Agents with intrinsic utility greater than ∆ui∗ choose action B,
and agents with intrinsic utility less than ∆ui
∗
choose A.
3.3.1 Supermodularity
Social dissonance games with a continuum of agents belong to a larger class, nonatomic
supermodular games, which are studied by Yang and Qi (2013). The key property of
supermodular games is that of increasing differences with respect to actions: the payoff
from choosing a particular action increases when a greater measure of other agents also
choose that action. Payoffs are also required to be monotone with respect to “type,” which
in the two-action game refers to the value of ∆ui. Once these properties are verified,
the results of Yang and Qi can then be used to establish monotone comparative statics
properties.
Theorem 10. Two action social dissonance games are supermodular.
Proof. Three properties characterize supermodular games. Firstly, payoffs for each player
i are order upper semi-continuous in i’s own action for a fixed distribution of other agents’
7 In cases where there is a positive measure of agents of the same ∆ui, the monotonicity result of
Theorem 9 applies, but there may also be asymmetric equilibria. See section 3.4 for discussion.
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actions and types, and a fixed ∆ui. Secondly, payoffs must be supermodular in a player’s
own action when the action is multi-dimensional. These two properties are trivially satisfied
since a player’s action space is finite and one dimensional.
Thirdly, each player i’s payoffs must exhibit increasing differences in own action s(i)
and the distribution of other agents’ actions and types plus the agent’s own type, ∆ui.
Social dissonance games defined here are anonymous, in that only the aggregate, µs(s(i)),
matters and not the types of the other agents who choose the agent’s own action, so it
suffices to verify that for all i, U i has increasing differences in other agents’ actions and in
∆ui.
Impose the order B > A on each agent’s action set8 . For action profiles, define an
analogous, albeit partial, ordering by letting s ≥ s′ if and only if s(i) ≥ s′(i) for almost all
i ∈ [0, 1]. An agent’s payoff function has increasing differences in others’ actions if s ≥ s′
implies that U i(B, s)−U i(A, s) ≥ U i(B, s′)−U i(A, s′). If this is expanded we can see that
the intrinsic utilities on either side of the inequality cancel out, leaving the condition
d(A,µs(A))− d(B,µs(B)) ≥ d(A,µs′(A))− d(B,µs′(B)) (3.4)
Note that when s ≥ s′, it is also true that µs(B) ≥ µs′(B) and µs(A) ≤ µs′(A). Since
social dissonance is non-decreasing in level of agreement, d(B,µs(B)) ≤ d(B,µs′(B)) and
d(A,µs(A)) ≥ d(A,µs′(A)). These are sufficient to verify (3.4).
Agents’ payoffs also exhibit increasing differences in own action and ∆ui. The increasing
differences property is evident from observing that, for any fixed profile of others’ actions,
the incremental benefit of choosing B over A, U i(B, s)−U i(A, s), increases when ui(B)−
ui(A) increases.
3.3.2 Comparative Statics
The family of two-action social dissonance games, {Γ(u, d)}, is parameterized by the utility
functions of the agents and the social dissonance function. Utility functions must be such
8 This ordering is arbitrary, but defined to be consistent with the definition of ∆ui = ui(B)− ui(A).
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that ∆ui is decreasing in i. The difference in dissonance between the two actions for each
aggregate action profile can be summarized by ∆d(s) := d(A,µs(A))− d(B, 1− µs(A)). 9
It is a best response to choose B if and only if ∆ui ≥ −∆d(s) and it is a best response
to choose A if and only if −∆ui ≥ ∆d(s). Since a player’s best response depends only
on the difference in utility between the two actions, ∆ui, and the difference in dissonance,
∆d(s), it follows that the set of equilibria depends on ∆ui for all i ∈ [0, 1] and ∆d(s) for
all s ∈ [0, 1]. We can define a partial order of the parameters by: (u1, d1) ≥B (u2, d2) if for
all i ∈ [0, 1], ∆ui1 ≥ ∆ui2 and for all s ∈ S, ∆d1(s) ≥ ∆d2(s).
When comparing the equilibrium sets of two games, we compare the smallest and
largest equilibria in each set. With respect to the partial order on action profiles defined
in Section 3.3.1, the smallest equilibrium is s∗ ∈ S such that s∗ ≥ s∗ for all equilbria s∗.
The largest equilibrium, s¯∗ is defined analogously. Yang and Qi’s main result is that the
set of monotone equilibria form a complete lattice10 , and thus, s∗ and s¯∗ are well-defined.
For two equilibrium sets ∫1 and ∫2, ∫1 ≥ ∫2 if inf(∫1) ≥ inf(∫2) and sup(∫1) ≥ sup(∫2).
If all agents’ intrinsic utilities for a particular action increase relative to their intrinsic
utilities for the other action, then we would expect that equilibrium choices would shift
toward the former action. Likewise, if the social dissonance function for a particular action
decreases relative to the social dissonance function for the other action, we would again
expect the equilibrium behavior to shift toward the former action. Applicable monotone
comparative statics results for finite games appear in Milgrom and Roberts (1990), and
for games with a continuum of agents in Acemoglu and Jensen (2010) and Yang and Qi
(2013). Below, I apply Yang and Qi’s result, but first need to establish some properties of
the family of games.
Lemma 11. Payoff functions U i have increasing differences in s and (u, d) with respect to
the partial order ≥B, holding fixed a player’s type and the type-action distribution of other
players.
9 Note that for any fixed action profile, µs(B) = 1− µs(A).
10 If S is the set of equilibria, then inf(S) and sup(S) are included in S.
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Proof. Fix a player’s type, ∆ui, the types of the other players (which are irrelevant to a
player’s own payoffs), and the profile of other agents’ action. We can show that for any
fixed profile of others’ actions, s, the incremental benefit of choosing B over A increases
when ∆d increases.
U i(B, s)− U i(A, s) = ui(B)− d(B,µs(B))− [ui(A)− d(A,µs(A))]
= ui(B)− ui(A) + d(A,µs(A))− d(B, 1− µs(A))
= ui(B)− ui(A) + ∆d(s)
Proposition 12. If two games, Γ(u1, d1) and Γ(u2, d2) with equilibrium sets ∫1 and ∫2 are
such that (u1, d1) ≥B (u2, d2), then ∫1 ≥ ∫2.
Proof. As shown in Lemma 11, payoffs have increasing differences in own action s(i) and
game parameters (u, d), holding fixed the actions and types of the players. This means
that if Γ(u1, d1) and Γ(u2, d2) do not have different ∆u
i for any i, but (u1, d1) ≥B (u2, d2),
then the incremental benefit of switching from A to B is higher in Γ.
Consistent with the partial ordering defined above, the distribution of player types is
monotone in that when (u1, d1) ≥B (u2, d2), the distribution of player types ∆u1 stochas-
tically dominates ∆u2. Since the family of two-action social dissonance games satisfies the
increasing differences property and monotonicity of player types, it is a monotone family
of supermodular games. Thus, Theorem 2 from Yang and Qi can be applied: both the
largest and smallest monotone equilibria rise monotonically with (u, d). Since all equilibria
of two-action social dissonance games are monotone, it follows that the largest and smallest
equilibria rise monotonically.
When agents’ intrinsic utlities rise with respect to the order ≥B, the largest and smallest
equilibria rise monotonically. A change in the equilibrium set may also be due to a change
in the dissonance function. A monotone shift in the dissonance function for one action,
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such as that resulting from a policy change, has a monotone effect on the difference in
dissonance, ∆d(s). Either an increase in d(A,µs(A)) for all s or a decrease in d(B,µs(B))
for all s would increase ∆d(s). The following two corollaries of Proposition 12 describe the
separate effects of changing either u or d while the other remains the same.
Corollary 1. If two games, Γ(u1, d1) and Γ(u2, d2) with equilibrium sets ∫1 and ∫2 have
the same utility profile (u1 = u2), and two different dissonance functions d1 and d2 such
that for all s, ∆d1(s) ≥ ∆d2(s), then ∫1 ≥ ∫2.
Proof. Since d1 = d2, ∆d1(s) = ∆d2(s) for all s. This fact combined with ∆u
i
1 ≥ ∆ui2 for
all i implies that (u1, d1) ≥B (u2, d2).
Corollary 2. If two games, Γ(u1, d1) and Γ(u2, d2), with equilibrium sets ∫1 and ∫2 share
the same dissonance function (d1 = d2) and have different intrinsic utility profiles u1 and
u2 such that for all i, ∆u
i
1 ≥ ∆ui2, then ∫1 ≥ ∫2.
3.4 Games with a Finite Number of Types
This section presents some two-action games where there are a finite number of types,
or distinct values of ∆ui. First, I consider a game where there are only two types. In
two-type games, there may be asymmetric equilibria where agents of the same type choose
differently. I also examine games with a third type of agent who is intrinsically indifferent
between the two actions.
3.4.1 Games with Two Types
Suppose there are two types of agents: type-b agents with the same ∆ui > 0 and type-a
with the same ∆ui < 0. Define ∆ub := ui(B)−ui(A) for type-b’s and ∆ua := ui(A)−ui(B)
for type-a’s.
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Let the measure of type-b agents be some real number µb ∈ (0, 1) and the measure of
type-a agents be µa = 1 − µb. Arrange the agents on [0,1] by intrinsic utility so type-b
agents are in [0, µb] and type-a’s are in (µb, 1].
The equilibrium set depends on the distribution of agents in the society, (µa, µb) and on
the strength of agents’ preferences relative to social dissonance. Equilibria can be classified
as either monolithic, where all agents choose the same action, true-to-type, where each
agent chooses his intrinsically preferred action, or asymmetric, where agents of the same
type may choose different actions.
Proposition 13. Sufficient conditions for monolithic and true-to-type equilibria are as
follows:
(1) If ∆ua ≤ d(A, 0), monolithic-B is an equilibrium.
(2) If ∆ub ≤ d(B, 0), monolithic-A is an equilibrium.
(3) If ∆ua ≥ d(A,µa)− d(B,µb) and ∆ub ≥ d(B,µb)− d(A,µa), true-to-type is an equilib-
rium.
Proof. (1) If all agents choose B, then B is the only best response for each player of type-
b regardless of the dissonance function. The condition ∆ua ≤ d(A, 0) together with the
fact d(B, 1) = 0 imply that ui(B) − ui(A) ≥ d(B, 1) − d(A, 0) for i ∈ (µb, 1], so B is a
best response for type-a agents. The proof of (2) is analogous. (3) If all type-a’s play A
and all type-b’s play B, the measure of agents playing each is µa and µb. The conditions
listed directly imply that A is a best response for type-a’s and B is a best response for
type-b’s
Certain types of action profiles can be ruled out as candidates for equilibrium.
Corollary 3. If, in equilibrium, some agents of one type play against-type, then all agents
of the other type must play true-to-type.
Direct proof of this result is provided in the appendix, but it is also a corollary of Theorem
9 on the monotonicity of equilibria. As with the result on monotonicity, the proof rests on
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the fact that if some type-a’s are choosing action B because it offers lower social dissonance,
then type-b’s are doubly glad to choose B.
Asymmetric equilibria are those where either type-a’s or type-b’s are split between the
two actions, and players of the other type all play true to type. To find equilibria where
type-a’s behave asymmetrically, compute (I1) the measure of players choosing A and B,
µ˜a(A) and µ˜a(B),
11 for which a type-a player is indifferent between playing A and playing
B. To find equilibria where type-b’s behave asymmetrically, compute (I2) µ˜b(A) and µ˜b(B)
for which type-b’s are indifferent between A and B. Under Assumptions 5, 6, and 7, there
is a single value of µ˜a(A) satisfying (I1) and a single value of µ˜b(A) satisfying (I2).
First, find the value of µ(A) satisfying (I1), µ˜a(A). µ˜a(A) is the value of µ(A) for which
∆ua = d(A,µ(A))− d(B, 1− µ(A)). In the case of social dissonance function
d(s(i), µs(s(i)) = max(0, 1− µs(s(i)
µ¯
) (3.5)
this is the value of µ(A) in [0,1] such that
∆ua = max(0, 1− µ(A)
µ¯
)−max(0, 1− 1− µ(A)
µ¯
)
The expression on the right side of the equation evaluates as:
=

1− µ(A)
µ¯
if µ(A) ∈ [0,min(µ¯, 1− µ¯)]
1− 2µ(A)
µ¯
if µ(A) ∈ [min(µ¯, 1− µ¯),max(µ¯, 1− µ¯)].
1− µ(A)
µ¯
− 1 if µ(A) ∈ [max(µ¯, 1− µ¯), 1].
(3.6)
Second, µ˜a(B) is the value of µ(A) for which
∆ub = d(B, 1− µ(A))− d(A,µ(A))
11 Subscript s for the action profile is omitted, since infinitely many profiles have µ(A) agents playing A
and µ(B) agents playing B.
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For the social dissonance function (3.5), this is the value of µ(A) such that
∆ub = max(0, 1− 1− µ(A)
µ¯
)−max(0, 1− µ(A)
µ¯
)
The expression on the right side of the equation evaluates as:
=

µ(A)
µ¯
− 1 if µ(A) ∈ [0,min(µ¯, 1− µ¯)]
2µ(A)− 1
µ¯
if µ(A) ∈ [min(µ¯, 1− µ¯),max(µ¯, 1− µ¯)].
1− 1− µ(A)
µ¯
if µ(A) ∈ [max(µ¯, 1− µ¯), 1].
(3.7)
∆ua
∆ub
d(B,µb)− d(A,µa)
d(A,µa)− d(B,µb)
µs(A)1µ˜a(A) µ˜a(B)
Figure 3.1: Finding asymmetric equilibria
Example 9. Suppose ∆ua = ∆ub = 0.25 and the dissonance function is (3.5) with µ¯ =
0.75. To find the equilibria where type-a chooses asymmetrically, find the value of µ(A) in
[0,1] for which
0.25 = max(0, 1− µ(A)
0.75
)−max(0, 1− 1− µ(A)
0.75
)
Solving this generates a value of µ˜a(A) = 13/32. The analogous condition for type-b is
0.25 = max(0, 1− 1− µ(A)
0.75
)−max(0, 1− µ(A)
0.75
)
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and µ˜b(B) = 19/32.
We can use these points of indifference to form the interval in which true-to-type equi-
librium is possible. In Example 9, the measure of type-a players, µa, must be in the
interval [13/32, 19/32] in order for a true-to-type equilibrium to be possible. If we find
that µ˜a(A) = µ˜a(B) then that is the only measure of type-a players that makes a true-
to-type equilibrium possible. If µ˜a(A) > µ˜a(B) then a true-to-type equilibrium is not
possible.
3.4.2 Games with Indifferent Agents
In many matters of public opinion and policy, there are individuals on either side of an
issue and those who are removed from it. In addition to type-a and type-b agents, we allow
for type-0 agents who are intrinsically indifferent between A and B; u0(A) = u0(B). Let
the measures of each type of agent be µa, µb, and µ0, with µa + µb + µ0 = 1. Arrange the
agents on [0,1] by intrinsic utility so those of type-b are found in [0, µb] and those of type-a
are found in (1− µa, 1], with type-0 in the middle, (µb, 1− µa].
Proposition 14. In an equilibrium with asymmetric choices among type-0 agents, social
dissonance for both actions must be equal.
Proof. If in equilibrium s, both A and B are chosen by type-0 agents, then both are
best responses of type-0 agents. Since u0(A) = u0(B), this implies that d(A,µs(A)) =
d(B,µs(B)).
Under the assumption that d(c, ·) is strictly decreasing in the second argument until reach-
ing zero, when indifferent agents act asymmetrically, one of two conclusions is possible.
Either there is a singular aggregate (µs(A), µs(B)) such that d(A,µs(A)) = d(B,µs(B))
or the social dissonance of both actions is zero. In the latter case, action profiles where
indifferent agents act asymmetrically are welfare-maximizing.
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Consider a society in which there are two ways of life, and in order to feel validated,
people require µ¯ of the population to join them, with µ¯ > µa and µ¯ > µb. Suppose further
that there are µ∗ ∈ (0, µ0) such that µ¯ ≤ min{µa+µ∗, µb+µ0−µ∗}. There are two groups
who both feel strongly about their preferred way of life, and a group that is indifferent.
To maximize the welfare among the population, we would like to encourage selection of an
equilibrium where type-a and type-b play true-to-type and type-0 agents split according
to a µ∗ satisfying the aforementioned criteria.
3.5 Games with a Continuum of Types
Static two-action social dissonance games with a continuum of agent types provide a frame-
work for empirical analysis where there is an incentive to conform. Allowing for a contin-
uous range of ∆ui is more realistic than assuming agents can be categorized into a small
number of homogeneous groups.
3.5.1 Assumptions on Functional Form
The best response condition for each agent depends on ∆ui := ui(B) − ui(A), for each
i ∈ [0, 1], and ∆d : [0, 1]→ R which is the difference in social dissonance between choosing
B and choosing A, given a proportion of other agents choosing B.
∆d(µs(B)) = d(B,µs(B))− d(A, 1− µs(B)) (3.8)
This way of defining ∆u and ∆d allows us to compare the incremental intrinsic utility
of choosing B to the incremental social dissonance of B. An equilibrium can be rationalized
by many different configurations of the intrinsic utility and social dissonance functions. To
simplify the analysis, we can make some assumptions about the specification for ∆ui and
∆d.
Assumption 8. ∆ui is continuous and strictly decreasing in i.
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Assumption 9. ∆ui
0
= 0 for some i0 ∈ (0, 1).
It seems reasonable that the distribution of intrinsic utilities in a large population is such
that for each individual, there is another who is within some small epsilon of intrinsic
utility, and that no two individuals have exactly the same intrinsic utilities. It follows from
Assumption 8 that ∆ui is bounded. That is, ∆u0 and ∆u1 are within some [umin, umax].
Assumption 9 focuses us on the interesting cases where there is a positive measure of people
who have a clear intrinsic preference for A and of those who have a clear intrinsic preference
for B.
One of the simplest specifications for d that satisfies Assumptions 5, 6, and 7 has
dissonance decreasing linearly in measure of agreement from its maximum, until reaching
zero at some measure of agreement that may be less than 1.
Assumption 10. The dissonance function, d, takes the following form:
d(si, µs(s
i)) = Msi ·max(0, 1−
µs(s
i)
esi
). (3.9)
For each action, there are two parameters. One is the maximum dissonance, Msi > 0,
which is experienced when no other agents agree with one’s own action. The second
parameter is the dissonance elimination level, esi ∈ (0, 1), or the minimum measure of
agreement from other agents needed for a zero level of dissonance. The dissonance functions
for each of the two actions can be combined into a single function ∆d, written as a function
of the measure of agents choosing B, µs(B). There are two main cases to deal with, based
on the values of eA and eB.
Social dissonance is zero for both actions when µs(B) ≥ eB and µs(A) ≥ eA. These
conditions together require that eB ≤ 1− eA. If this inequality is strict, there is a portion
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of the graph of ∆d that is flat and the function can be written as:
∆d(µs(B)) =

MB · (1− µs(B)
eB
) if µs(B) ≤ eB
0 if eB ≤ µs(B) ≤ 1− eA
−MA · (1− 1− µs(B)
eA
) if µs(B) ≥ 1− eA
(3.10)
∆d
µs(B)eB 1− eA 1
MB
−MA
Figure 3.2: An example of ∆d following the form of 3.10
In the case that eB ≥ 1− eA, ∆d is strictly decreasing in µs(B) over [0, 1], and there is a
single value of µs(B) for which ∆d = 0. ∆d can be written as:
∆d(µs(B)) =

MB · (1− µs(B)
eB
) if µs(B) ≤ 1− eA
MB · (1− µs(B)
eB
)−MA · (1− 1− µs(B)
eA
) if 1− eA ≤ µs(B) ≤ eB
−MA · (1− 1− µs(B)
eA
) if µs(B) ≥ eB
(3.11)
Observe that in both of these cases, the function ∆d takes on a nonzero value for at
least one value of µs(B). This, in combination with Assumptions (8) and (9), guarantees
there is some positive measure of agents for which choosing their intrinsically preferred
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∆d
µs(B)1− eA eB 1
MB
−MA
Figure 3.3: An example of ∆d following the form of 3.11
action is not a dominant strategy. Hence, these agents must consider what others are
planning to do.
We might argue that case 2 is much more common in reality; if we assume that being
in the minority causes a positive level of social dissonance, this is eA, eB ≥ 1/2.
3.5.2 Equilibrium
Equilibria are monotone under Assumptions 5, 6, and 7, which is to say that the players
who choose B are those with the strongest intrinsic preference for it. In equilibrium, players
on [0, 1] to the left of some threshold choose B, and those to the right of the threshold choose
A.
A monolithic action profile is a monotone action profile in which all agents choose
the same action. These can be studied separately, and conditions for monolithic equilibria
are provided in section 3.4 and a previous essay. Here, we focus mainly on identifying
non-monolithic equilibria, which are action profiles s∗ with a positive measure of agents
choosing either action, such that for (almost) all i ∈ [0, µs∗(B)],
∆ui ≥ ∆d(µs∗(B)) (3.12)
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and for (almost) all i ∈ [1− µs∗(B), 1],
∆ui ≤ ∆d(µs∗(B)) (3.13)
Together these imply that for each equilibrium s∗, there is a threshold agent, i∗ such that
∆ui
∗
= ∆d(µs∗(B)) and since µs∗(B) = i
∗, this condition is
∆ui
∗
= ∆d(i∗) (3.14)
Depending on the functional form, there may be multiple non-monolithic equilibria.
3.5.3 Basic Linear Specification
The specifications in the previous sections impose boundedness and linearity on ∆ui and
piecewise linearity on ∆d. Here, I specify a model which allows for only the most basic
features.
Intrinsic utility, through the mapping ∆ui : [0, 1] → R should allow for a positive
measure of two types of agents: those who intrinsically prefer A and those who intrinsically
prefer B. One way to do this is to allow for only two values of ∆ui: a positive value and
a negative one. Another way to do this, consistent with Assumption 8, is to let ∆ui be
linear in i, as in Dixit (2003).
∆ui = β − αi (3.15)
with α > β > 0. The measure of agents who prefer B is i0 = β/α and the measure who
prefer A is 1− β/α. 12 If the assumption eA = eB = 1 is imposed on ∆d, equation 3.11
reduces to
∆d(µs(B)) = MB − µs(B)(MA +MB) (3.16)
12 This can be further simplied to ∆ui = β − i if one wishes to reduce the number of parameters.
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This is again similar to the specification in Dixit (2003) and can be written as 13
∆d(µs(B)) = σ − τ · µs(B) (3.17)
Using the specification given in (3.15) and (3.17) in threshold condition (3.14), the threshold
agent in a non-monolithic equilibrium is
i∗ =
σ − β
τ − α (3.18)
∆d
µs(B)1
MB
−MA
i∗
Figure 3.4: Finding the threshold agent in the basic linear model
3.5.4 General Linear Specification
If we remove the assumption eA = eB = 1, and allow for these parameters to be any
values in (0, 1), ∆d will follow either (3.10) or (3.11), but the logic for finding the set of
non-monotone equilibria is the same.
There may be a portion of the graph of ∆d that is flat, but this does not complicate
things much. The set of potential equilibria is limited by the fact that when dissonance
13 An even simpler specification would be ∆d(µs(B)) = σ−µs(B). For this, we would require 0 < σ < 1
so there is a minimum measure of agents choosing A, between 0 and 1, for which the dissonance of B is at
least as great as the dissonance of A.
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is zero for all agents, and Assumptions (8) and (9) hold, there is a single agent who is
indifferent between the two actions. If ∆d = 0 in equilibrium, we have i∗ = i0 14 , with
s∗(i) = B for i < i∗ and s∗(i) = A for i > i∗.
Otherwise, the computation of the threshold agent is similar to that in the case where
eA = eB = 1; we just have to consider more cases where ∆u
i may intersect ∆d.
In case 1, monolithic-A is not an equilibrium, since there are agents for whom B is a
dominant strategy. In fact, monolithic-B is the only equilibrium in this type of situation.
In case 2, monolithic-A and monolithic-B are both equilibria. To see why monolithic-A
is an equilibrium, consider the decision of the agent i = 0 whose incremental benefit from
choosing B is outweighed by the incremental dissonance of going it alone. If the agent of
strongest intrinsic preference for B is not willing to deviate from A, then none of the other
agents will. A true-to-type action profile is also an equilibrium; all agents, if choosing
true-to-type, face zero dissonance and have no reason not to choose according to intrinsic
preference. Notice there are two other points where ∆u crosses ∆d, and for i∗ = µs(B),
satisfy equilibrium conditions (3.12) and (3.13).
In case 3, both monolithic-A and monolithic-B are ruled out as equilibria, since for
each action there is an agent who would be willing to choose it alone. Only true-to-type is
an equilibrium.
14 If the threshold agent is i0 the equilibrium is true-to-type.
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∆d
µs(B)eB 1− eA 1
MB
−MA
Figure 3.5: Case 1: Single monolithic equilibrium
∆d
µs(B)eB 1− eA 1
MB
−MA
Figure 3.6: Case 2: True-to-type and both monolithic equilibria
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∆d
µs(B)eB 1− eA 1
MB
−MA
Figure 3.7: Case 3: Single true-to-type equilibrium
The above cases are not an exhaustive taxonomy of possible situations, but should provide
an idea of how to determine the equilibrium set from a given (∆u,∆d) pair.
3.6 Social Dynamics
Trends for behavior (and opinion) throughout history often follow a pattern where one
behavior is dominant, there is a shift to another behavior, and that second behavior remains
dominant until the next shift. Before the shift, the previously dominant behavior is chosen
by a relatively steady proportion of the population, and after the shift, the proportion of
the population choosing the newly dominant behavior approaches its own steady state.
The static model of social dissonance games provides three explanations for a shift in
observed behavior. Two of these are discussed in section 3.3.2 on comparative statics.
Intrinsic utilities may change and social dissonance functions may change. Another pos-
sibility is that a different equilibrium is selected from a set of multiple equilibria. The
literature on global games, including Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2003) addresses this
mechanism in a game with noisy information. In games of complete information, there is
little guidance about how one equilibrium is selected, though Bisin, Moro and Topa (2011)
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provide a framework for estimating parameters in network games with multiple equilibria.
3.6.1 Challenges in Identification
If we assume a single observation represents an equilibrium of a social dissonance game,
there is an infinite set of possible intrinsic utility and dissonance functions that can explain
the observation. Too much flexibility can lead to “overfitting;” nonlinearities and plateaus
in the dissonance function, for instance, need to be justified if the model is to have pre-
dictive power. Even assuming that a series of observations i∗1, i∗2, ..., i∗T fits the basic linear
specification of section 3.5.3, the functions ∆u and ∆d are defined in terms of four pa-
rameters: α, β, σ and τ , each of which can change over time. In order to identify these
parameters, some additional assumptions may be needed about which parameters change
from one observation to the next.
As an example, consider the rise of cohabitation of unmarried couples in the United
States. State by state, divorce laws shifted to a no-fault system where partners may agree
to end a marriage based on “irreconcilable differences” rather than a fault-based system
where divorce can only be triggered by infidelity, abuse, or protracted separation (Vlosky
and Monroe, 2002). No-fault divorce laws in the United States were enacted as early as
1969, but the vast majority went into effect between 1970 and 1979. It can be argued that
no-fault divorce lowers the sanctity of marriage, hence lowering the social dissonance of
cohabitation as a marriage alternative for couples in committed relationships.
Cohabitation increased following the shift to no-fault divorce, but the increase cannot
be pinned on this clearly identifiable “shift in institutions.” In most states, cohabitation
was also increasing leading up to the passage of the law, so perhaps the “institution” was
already shifting in advance of the anticipated legal change. Additionally, there is a learning
explanation - in the spirit of Fogli and Veldkamp (2011) - as more couples cohabit, the
costs and benefits become more apparent to others who previously followed the status quo
because of ambiguity about cohabitation-related outcomes.
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In this example, three separate explanations have already been proposed: the insti-
tution shifted when the law was changed, the institution was shifting before the law was
changed, and there was a shift in intrinsic utilities. Surely, combinations of these as well
as other explanations are possible. The monotone comparative statics results of section
(3.3.2) support many hypotheses, and it is even possible that either ∆u or ∆d moves in
a counterintuitive direction, yet is offset by a movement in the other set of parameters.
Ahead, I consider the consequences of highly restrictive assumptions about functional form
and changes in parameters.
3.6.2 Shifting Institutions and Drifting Intrinsic Utilities
Suppose that the basic linear specification of (3.15) and (3.17) is a reasonable representation
of the distribution of intrinsic utilities and social dissonance. The equilibrium proportion
of agents choosing B (3.18) is a function of the parameters α, β, σ, and τ . Suppose further
that we assume intrinsic utilities drift over time, by some learning process, whether or not
the institution shifts. Holding dissonance parameters τ and σ constant, the effect of a
change in α from one observation to another (holding β fixed) is
i∗2 =
τ − α1
τ − α2 i
∗
1 (3.19)
If intrinsic utilities continue to drift to α3 and the institution lowers social dissonance for
B so τ3 < τ2, the effect on equilibrium is:
i∗3 =
τ3 − σ + β
τ2 − σ + β ·
τ2 − α2
τ3 − α3 i
∗
2 (3.20)
There is, of course, the question of whether a shift in intrinsic utilities will apply more
pressure to policymakers and other leaders to shift an institution. In many cases, the
shift in i∗ before the shift in institution will be in the same direction as the shift in i∗
after the institution changes. In other cases, the institution shifts in the opposite direction
as an observed shift in i∗. For example, countermeasures to increase social dissonance
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may be enacted when strategic defaults become too common or if public smoking becomes
widespread.
3.7 Dynamic Games
Consistency is a valued trait. Politicians often suffer from a damaged reputation for chang-
ing their stances on issues. People can also be subject to psychic costs associated with
changes in opinion or behavior, representing an internal inconsistency (Festinger, 1962)
between one’s past and present selves. These switching costs can prevent a good idea
from being adopted, or cause inertia when intrinsic utilities shift to favor one action over
another. However, if agents anticipate that an institution will shift, they may shade their
expressed opinions in the direction of the shift to reduce social dissonance.
Dissonance in period t depends only on the action profile for period t. The switching
cost, c(sit, s
i
t−1), is the cost of taking action sit given that action sit−1 was chosen in the
previous period. Assume c(sit, s
i
t−1) > 0 if sit 6= sit−1 and c(sit, sit−1) = 0 if sit = sit−1. The
utility in period t for agent i, given current action profile st and the previous period’s
action profile st−1, is
U it (st, st−1) = u
i(sit)− d(sit, µst(sit))− c(sit, sit−1) (3.21)
Thus, the payoffs in a dynamic social dissonance game with switching costs, assuming no
discounting and no changes in the intrinsic utilities or dissonance function, are
U i({st}Tt=0) =
T∑
t=0
[ui(sit)− d(sit, µst(sit))]−
T∑
t=1
c(sit, s
i
t−1) (3.22)
3.7.1 Two-Period Model
In a two-period model, the payoffs to agent i are
ui(si1) + u
i(si2)− d(si1, µs1(si1))− d(si2, µs2(si2))− c(si2, si1) (3.23)
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where s1 and s2 are the action profiles of the agents in periods 1 and 2.
There may be equilibria where all agents choose the same action in both periods and
equilibria where some agents switch. Due to positive switching costs, if a first-period action
profile is an equilibrium in the one-period game, and the other agents do not switch their
actions in the second period, then an agent’s best response is to continue with the same
action. However, if there is an expectation that the actions of others will change and there
is a sufficiently lowered dissonance from making the same change, then agents may be
willing to bear the switching cost.
To simplify the discussion, consider a society with two types of agents, as in section
3.4.1, and a switching cost, c > 0, when si1 6= si2. When agents do not switch, the payoffs
are 2ui(si1)−2d(si1, µs1(si1)). As in the static model, some agents face a conflict between the
motives to maximize intrinsic utility and to reduce social dissonance. The equilibrium set
may include monolithic-A, monolithic-B, true-to-type, or the same asymmetric equilibrium
played twice. Conditions for these are found in section 3.4.1.
There are many candidates for two-period equilibria. Focusing only on the symmetric
action profiles, there are nine possible combinations of monolithic-A, monolithic-B, and
true-to-type. If a two-period action profile is an equilibrium, there can be no deviations
from that profile that would improve the payoffs of either type of agent. For example, if
(monolithic-A, true-to-type) is an equilibrium, it must be that
2∆ua − d(A,µ(A)) ≥ ∆ua − d(B, 1− µ(A))− c
2∆ua − d(A,µ(A)) ≥ −d(B, 0)− d(B, 1− µ(A))
(3.24)
and
∆ub − d(B, 1− µ(A))− c ≥ −d(A,µ(A))
∆ub − d(B, 1− µ(A))− c ≥ 2∆ub − d(B, 0)− d(B, 1− µ(A))
(3.25)
The first pair of conditions compares a type-a player’s payoff from choosing A in both
periods to the payoffs from choosing (A,B) and (B,B). A deviation to (B,A) is dominated by
(A,A) because it has a lower intrinsic utility, higher switching cost, and higher dissonance.
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The last two conditions compare a type-b player’s payoff from choosing A in the first period
and B in the second to (A,A) and (B,B). (B,A) is dominated by (A,B).
Example 10. Suppose there is a society which is half type-a and half type-b. We have
ua(A) = ub(B) = P , where 0 < P < 1, ua(B) = ub(A) = 0, and d(sit, µst(s
i
t)) = max(0, 1−
µst(s
i
t)
0.5
) for t = 1, 2. In the stage game (without switching cost), the equilibria are true-
to-type, monolithic-A, and monolithic-B. There are also asymmetric equilibria where one
type is evenly split between A and B. When there is no switching cost, we can see that
the equilibria in the two-period game are formed by selecting pairs from the set of the
one-period game’s equilibrium set.
However, if switching cost, C, is strictly positive, then some of the pairs of one-period
equilibria may be excluded from the set of two-period equilibria. For a two-period strategy
profile of (monolithic-A, monolithic-B) or (monolithic-B, monolithic-A) the payoff to a
player of either type is P − C. If a player of either type deviates unilaterally to choose
his intrinsically preferred action in both periods, the switching cost is avoided, but a
social dissonance cost of −1 is incurred for a total payoff of 2P − 1. Thus (monolithic-A,
monolithic-B) and (monolithic-B, monolithic-A) are equilibria if and only if P + C ≤ 1.
A similar analysis reveals that profiles involving one period of monolithic choices and one
period of true-to-type choices are equilibria if P + C ≤ 1 and P ≥ C.
3.8 Conclusion
This essay extends the model of finite-agent social dissonance games to games with a
continuum of agents. This represents a more natural way of handling aggregate-level data.
Supermodularity, monotonicity of equilibria and monotone comparative statics properties
carry over to the continuum-of-agents model. Due to the individual agent’s lack of influence,
asymmetric equilibria are possible among non-indifferent agents.
65
There are many modeling choices that need to made in advance of using the social dis-
sonance paradigm to measure or predict the effect of a policy. Evidence from psychology
can help indicate the general shape of social dissonance functions, including degree of con-
cavity and the point of dissonance elimination. Knowledge of mental and social processes
can also aid in understanding when a dynamic game, with its psychic cost of switching
one’s action or opinion, is appropriate.
Identification of parameters may require additional assumptions about the baseline rate
of learning in a population and how it affects trends in behavior, as well as awareness of
how changes in institutions are anticipated. There is an additional element, unexplored
here, of how opinions and behavior can push institutions to change, which in turn influences
opinions and behavior. In my model, I have treated social dissonance and intinsic utilities
as two separate entities, but I hope that future work will successfully integrate the two,
while recognizing the flexible boundary between the individual and society.
Chapter 4
Impulse and Temptation
4.1 Introduction
People feel impulses to consume unhealthy things. These impulses are often brought on
by sensory cues, but can also arise spontaneously from a train of thoughts or a physiological
process. If I mention ice cream, you might get an impulse to consume ice cream. You resolve
this impulse by weighing the imagined pleasure you would gain from consuming ice cream
against the costs: transportation to the nearest ice cream retailer, some money, and some
negative consequences for your health. If you are able to overcome the impulse to consume
ice cream, perhaps you are better able to resist it in the future.1
Your method of dealing with the impulse is important to future consumption. If you
go to the ice cream parlor and purchase one ice cream cone, the impulse is sated for now
with no further temptation to consume. If, however, you go to the store and buy a carton
of ice cream, this will both tempt you to consume more in the present period, and provide
a low cost way of fulfilling future impulses. Even if you are aware that you will face further
1 Another view is the opposite, that we have a stock of “cognitive control” that gets depleted each time
we override an impulse.
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temptation to consume, the low per-unit cost of buying a carton may make it seem a better
decision than buying a single serving of ice cream.
Cigarette smokers face impulses but do not often have a choice about the quantity of
cigarettes they purchase. In the U.S., a pack contains twenty cigarettes, and cartons contain
ten packs. Smaller packs are prohibited, and single cigarettes, or “loosies,” are not made
available by cigarette manufacturers. The World Health Organization (WHO) advises
governments to ban the sale of loosies, and many follow this recommendation. One of the
reasons cited for this stance against single cigarettes is that their availability encourages
consumption by minors and young adults, who are thought to be more susceptible to habit
formation than older adults (Ling and Glantz, 2002).
For consumers who are already addicted to cigarettes, or those who are occasional
smokers that may become addicted, single cigarettes represent a way to fulfill impulses
while limiting the temptation to consume further. Formerly-quit smokers may describe
how, overcome by an urge for “just one puff,” the purchase of a full pack leads to a
complete relapse into the old habit. One might argue that by forcing smokers to choose
between no cigarettes and a full pack, the high price of the pack and the knowledge of one’s
self-control problem would induce the would-be smoker to forgo smoking altogether. This
is optimistic, though, knowing the overwhelming strength of the compulsion when it is
triggered. Single cigarettes allow for fulfillment of intense impulses without the temptation
of the remaining pack.
Many smokers buy packs instead of cartons as a self-control measure. Smokers also
report using loosies for self-control purposes (Thrasher et al., 2009), even though the per-
cigarette cost is nearly twice what is paid when buying a pack.2 There is evidence that
larger portions of food in restaurants induce diners to eat more, even though taking home
leftovers is an option (Rolls et al. 2002). Wansink et al. (2005) offer the explanation that
visual cues of portion sizes suggest larger consumption norms. It is possible that the pack
2 Buyers of single cigarettes also name convenience as a reason for their choices, so perhaps transaction
costs are a significant factor preventing impulsive purchases.
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size of twenty cigarettes suggests a consumption norm that smokers are inclined to follow.
Nearly 30% of smokers report smoking exactly twenty cigarettes per day. Even with some
measurement error, it appears that smokers in the U.S. anchor their daily consumption to
the size of the pack. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of number of cigarettes smoked by
current smokers3 with a bin size of 5.
Figure 4.1: Self-reported number of cigarettes smoked per day for current smokers.
Cigarette manufacturers, like producers of other consumables, decide how to bundle
their products to maximize revenue in the present and future periods. The choice of twenty
cigarettes per pack is perhaps practical – it reduces packaging and transaction costs – and
perhaps strategic – knowing that consumers can easily become tempted and addicted, a
larger pack provides impetus for further consumption by the otherwise one-time smoker.
This can increase future revenue far beyond the revenue lost from would-be infrequent
smokers dissuaded by the high price of a pack.
Producer choice is not the only factor determining how cigarettes are sold to consumers.
3 Data retrieved from Minnesota Population Center, Integrated Health Interview Series. Survey was
conducted in 1997. The distribution of daily smoking in 2001 is similar, even in the face of a greater than
50% increase in the per-pack price.
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Policy is also relevant. By using a model of decision-making with temptation inspired by
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2007), I investigate the question of how the availability of single
cigarettes affects the incidence and intensity of smoking. That is, how does the policy
banning single cigarettes separately influence the number of smokers and the number of
cigarettes each smoker consumes? In a one-period model in which addiction is irrelevant
and consumers are aware of the temptations of a larger pack, a policy which removes the
small or single-serving pack from consideration can only be welfare-decreasing. Since the
one-period model is unrealistic, I investigate separately the effects of addiction and naivete
about temptation, each of which may justify the policy.
Naivete about temptation does not lead to mistaken purchase of the small pack, and
removal of the small pack from the choice set does not reduce the distortionary effect of
naivete on the valuation of the large pack relative to its closest alternative. Therefore,
it does not appear that naivete about temptation is in itself a sufficient justification for
prohibiting sale of the small pack.
The effect of prohibiting the small pack is less clear in the two-period setting. Some
consumers who would otherwise purchase a small pack will instead purchase a large pack
and abstain from consuming further, which is inefficient, but as in the one-period model,
there will be consumers who avoid purchase altogether. While it is not formally addressed
here, it is possible that mistaken beliefs about addiction can justify a government policy
restricting the sale of the small pack. I have set up the framework of accounting for this
question, but it is up to the empirical researcher to gather data on actual and forecasted
addiction.
4.2 Literature
Pollak (1970) is one of the earliest authors to point out and model the fact that short-run
consumption affects long-run consumption through habit formation. His utility functions
have a “psychological need” parameter which is a function of consumption in each of the
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past periods; I model psychological needs by tracking the distribution of impulses in the
present period as a Markov process.
Becker and Murphy (1988) present a model of rational addiction where consumers
have complete information about how present consumption will affect the utility of future
consumption. My model focuses on the effects of menu4 choice and consumption on
impulses, and allows agents to be misinformed or uncertain about the effects of their
consumption choices on future impulses.
Bernheim and Rangel (2004) construct a model in which decision makers operate in
either a cold mode, in which choices are made by cognitive control to maximize utility,
or a hot mode, where a strong impulse overwhelms cognitive control to induce use of an
addictive substance. The hot mode is stochastically triggered, with a probability that
depends on the activity chosen while in a cold mode. Decision makers may choose an
environment that is absent of consumption cues; my model allows consumers to block
themselves from having a ready supply of a tempting substance.
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) introduce temptation preferences with self-control where an
agent incurs a cost from resisting a tempting second-best alternative that the ex-ante self
found inferior. Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) extends the model of self-control and temptation
to dynamic infinite-horizon decision problems, and Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) uses this
model to incorporate addiction. In the latter paper, the effects of government price policy
and policy on maximal consumption are analyzed separately. The main question I address
in this essay is not about the welfare effects of limiting maximal consumption, but rather,
setting a minimal purchase quantity.
4.3 Theoretical Framework
The framework of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) provides inspiration for the model of con-
sumer temptation that follows. In their model, larger menus of different goods require a
4 Going forward, I use menu instead of pack to be consistent with existing literature on temptation.
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higher cost of self-control to resist a tempting alternative. Since there is only one good in
my model, the cost of temptation is reflected in the increased likelihood of a strong im-
pulse when a larger menu has been selected. In Gul and Pesendorfer (2007), the study of
temptation is extended to a multi-period setting which allows for consumption-dependent
addiction that increases the intensity of future impulses.
Before describing the timing of consumer impulses and decisions, I will say a word
about menus. A menu is used in this paper to describe a set of possible consumption plans
of a single good in a single time period. Once a menu has been chosen by a consumer
at the beginning of a time period, the choices available to the consumer are fixed. There
is no opportunity to purchase more of the good, or to change to a different menu. The
consumer may choose to consume less than the maximum quantity available and discard
the remaining items.
There are three menus available to the consumer: the empty menu (∅), a small menu (S),
and a large menu (L). Within each time period, there are two opportunities to consume
a single unit of the good. These two consumption choices are c1 and c2 ∈ {0, 1}, thus
∅ = {(c1, c2) = (0, 0)}, S = {(c1, c2) : c1 + c2 ∈ {0, 1}}, and L = {(c1, c2) : c1 + c2 ∈
{0, 1, 2}}. The model could conceivably be extended to accommodate more opportunities
for consumption within a single time period and hence, more choices of menus.5
4.3.1 Consumers in the One-Period Model
The timing of a consumer’s decision-making within each period is as follows: first, the
consumer experiences a stochastic impulse to consume one unit of the good. Individuals
may differ in the intensity of impulses they experience. An impulse, I, which represents
how much the consumer is willing to pay in pecuniary and health costs to remove the urge
to consume, is drawn from some distribution Φ with support in [0,∞).
After the stochastic impulse is realized, the consumer enters the purchase phase, where
5 For example, if one wishes to directly study the policy on cigarette packages, the largest menu could
contain twenty and any smaller menu could also be available.
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a menu, m is chosen from a menu of menus, M = {∅, S, L}. M and the prices, pm, for
each m ∈ M are determined exogenously by manufacturers, retailers, and regulations.
The consumer may also choose the empty menu and forgo purchase. Immediately after
purchasing a non-empty menu, the consumer fulfills the initial impulse by consuming one
unit of the good.6
Following the purchase and initial consumption decisions, the consumer enters a temp-
tation phase, where a second, usually less intense impulse, I ′ ∈ [0,∞) is drawn from
another distribution, Φ′(m) that depends on the remaining quantity of goods available on
the menu, and hence, the menu chosen. This temptation is potentially exacerbated in a
“use it or lose it” scenario.7 For example, if a consumer has an impulse for a hamburger,
and the vendor offers a “buy one, get one free” special, the weak temptation for the second
hamburger and/or aversion to discarding it, can lead to consumption in excess of what the
consumer needed to fulfill the initial impulse. A tempting good is defined as one where the
consumer’s impulse to consume it becomes stronger once it is in his possession. The rea-
sons for this could be many; disposal aversion (Bolton and Alba, 2012) is but one possible
motivation. The key assumption of my model is that temptation-phase impulses are more
likely to be intense when a large menu was chosen.
Assumption 11. For two menus m and mˆ with m ⊂ mˆ, Φ′(mˆ) first-order stochastically
dominates Φ′(m).
After the temptation phase, ex post utility is tallied. For unhealthy goods that represent a
small portion of the budget, we can assume utility is linear in money. Hence, I proceed by
ignoring the utility of normal goods.8 Unfulfilled impulses are treated as costs. In each
6 This assumption may be relaxed, but is based on a premise that the initial impulse is most intense,
so the main goal of purchase is to fulfill that initial impulse, rather than defer consumption. Assumption
15 frames this for a discrete impulse distribution.
7 In this paper, I do not allow for saving. But even in the case when saving is possible, the availability
of the saved menu items could increase the strength of the initial impulse in future periods and lower the
marginal cost of fulfilling those impulses.
8 The price of the menus enters the decision-making process through the consumer’s maximization of
surplus.
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period the consumer’s utility is separable into a disutility of unfulfilled impulses I and I ′,
and a health cost H. Utility can be written as
U(c1, c2; I, I ′) = (1− c1)(−I) + (1− c2)(−I ′)−H(c1 + c2) (4.1)
where the realization of I ′ is drawn from a distribution that depends on m.
Initial
Impulse
I ∼ Φ
Purchase
m ∈M
Consume 1
c1 ∈ {0, 1}
Temptation
I ′ ∼ Φ′(m)
Consume
Further
c2 ∈ {0, 1}
Payoffs
U
Figure 4.2: Timing of impulses and decisions in the one-period model
The one-period value of a menu is determined by the consumption choices from it that
maximize expected utility, with respect to the initial impulse. The expectation below
reflects a sophisticated agent’s beliefs about temptation-phase impulses.
V s(m, I) = max
c1,c2∈m
Es(m)[U(c
1, c2; I, I ′)|I] (4.2)
where E(m) is the expectation with respect to the distribution Φ′(m) of I ′.
The consumer chooses a menu m from menu of menus M and consumption from that
menu, given an initial impulse I, expected temptation-phase impulses, and prices. Gul
and Pesendorfer (2001) provide a utility function representation that allows for ranking of
menus, based on how consumers evaluate choices before and after temptation is manifest.
Since the impulses in my model are stochastic, the consumer can only anticipate tempta-
tions and decide based on expected utility. The consumer’s problem in a one-period model
is to choose a menu that attains the maximum expected surplus, which is given by
max
m∈M
V s(m, I)− pm (4.3)
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4.3.2 Behavioral Types
Consumers differ in their knowledge of own self-control and susceptibility to addiction.
Sophisticated consumers are aware of the difference in strength between temptation-phase
impulses with and without a menu that includes more than one unit of the good. Consumers
who are unaware of this difference are naive and behave as if according to a different value
function, V n. They choose a menu m to solve:
max
m∈M
V n(m, I)− pm (4.4)
The value function V n(m, I) obtains from maximization of expected utility, as V s does,
but with respect to a mistaken distribution that underestimates the probability of non-
negligible impulses. An extreme case of naivete would be the belief that temptation-phase
impulses are drawn from Φ′(∅) when they are in fact drawn from Φ′(L).
4.3.3 Consumers in the Multi-Period Model
In each time period, consumers make decisions about which menu to purchase and how
much to consume. In addition to pecuniary and health costs and the discomfort of unful-
filled impulses, consumers must also weigh the risks of addiction. Addiction is represented
by an increased likelihood of non-negligible impulses in future periods following consump-
tion. Each period’s initial-phase impulses are drawn from a distribution Φt, which evolves
from one period to the next, as a function of the level of consumption in the previous
period, ct−1 = c1t−1 + c2t−1.
Assumption 12. The evolution of initial-phase impulses is such that Φt+1 first-order
stochastically dominates Φt if ct ≥ 1.
The timeline below summarizes impulses and decisions within each time period and
adds the evolution of initial-phase impulses described in Assumption 12.
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Initial
Impulse
It ∼ Φt
Purchase
mt ∈M
Consume 1
c1t ∈ {0, 1}
Temptation
I ′t ∼ Φ′t(m)
Consume
Further
c2t ∈ {0, 1}
Payoffs
Ut
Initial
Impulse
It+1 ∼ Φt+1
Figure 4.3: Timing of impulses and decisions in the multi-period model
In each period, the utility realized depends on consumption and impulses.
Ut(c
1
t , c
2
t ; It, I
′
t) = (1− c1t )(−It) + (1− c2t )(I ′t)−H(c1t + c2t ) (4.5)
In the one-period model, the value function specifies the maximum utility that could
be obtained, given a menu and initial-phase impulse; the consumer’s problem is to choose
the menu that maximizes surplus: utility minus cost. In the multi-period setting, there
is an interdependence between one-period value functions and spending on menus. The
menu chosen in the present period affects consumption, which in turn affects the next
period’s impulses and menu choices. Hence, the multi-period value function will describe
the maximum utility obtainable, given a series of menus and an initial impulse. The
consumer’s problem is then to choose the series of menus that maximizes time-discounted
surplus. For simplicity, prices of menus are assumed to be time-independent. If mt = mt+1
then pmt = pmt+1 .
The formulation below is recursive, in that the present period’s value depends on the
next period’s value. Sophisticated consumers choose c1t and c
2
t in period t knowing their
effect on the distribution of impulses in period t+ 1. The multi-period value function is
V st ({mk}Tk=t, It) = max
(c1t ,c
2
t )∈mt
Es(mt)[U(c
1
t , c
2
t ; It, I
′
t) + βV
s
t+1({mk}Tk=t+1, It+1)|It] (4.6)
where It+1 is distributed according to Φt+1 which depends on Φt and ct.
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The consumer’s problem is to choose the sequence of menus that solves
max
{mk}Tk=t
V st ({mk}Tk=t, It)−
T∑
k=t
βk−tpmt (4.7)
where V sT+1 = 0.
4.3.4 Behavioral Types in the Multi-Period Model
Consumers may differ in knowledge of their own vulnerabilities to addiction. A farsighted
consumer predicts, with complete accuracy, the effect that present consumption will have
on the future impulse distribution; a myopic consumer underestimates this addictive effect
of consumption. Myopia and farsightedness can interact with awareness of the effect of
temptation in the short-term. The sophisticated, farsighted consumer is aware of both the
temptation that will occur and the effect of consumption on future urges, and plans for
those. The sophisticated, myopic consumer knows the temptation that will occur, and
plans for it, but is unaware of the effect of consumption on future impulses. We can assign
some mistaken impulse evolution process Φ˜t which depends on Φt−1 and ct−1.
The naive, farsighted consumer understands the effect of consumption on future urges
but is unaware of his self-control problem in the face of temptation. Assign a mistaken value
of Φ˜′t(L) to represent the naive consumer’s forecasted temptation-phase beliefs following
purchase of a large menu. In the extreme, Φ˜′t(L) = Φ˜′t(∅). The naive, myopic consumer
is aware of neither his self-control problem nor the effect of consumption on future urges.
This is often a first-time consumer with no education on these post-consumption effects.
4.3.5 Policy
Welfare maximization may be brought about by reducing consumption of certain harmful
goods that are both tempting and addictive. If the government has evidence that con-
sumption of a harmful good is often just a response to addiction, the policy may include
provisions to prevent inexperienced consumers from trying the good, such as prohibition
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of small menus. On the other hand, if the temptation following purchase of large menus
is overwhelming, the government may wish to implement a policy that makes small menus
available. The analysis that follows assumes that consumers may always choose either an
empty menu or a large menu, but compares the choices with and without the availability
of a small menu.
4.4 Model with Discrete Impulse Distribution
To simplify the analysis and develop intuition, I consider a model that discretizes the
impulse distribution to three states. Government policy or firms’ choices may remove the
availability of S. The main question is to identify conditions under which removal of S
may improve welfare.
At the beginning of each time period, an impulse, I, is realized, which can be either
intense (IT ), weak (IW ), or negligible (IN ), with probabilities P(T ), P(W ), and P(N)
that sum to 1. A negligible impulse is one that the consumer can coldly reject without
exercising self-control, while weak and intense impulses cause discomfort if left unfulfilled.
The decision-maker can choose to purchase either ∅, L, or, if it is available, S, with prices
pL > pS .
9 Additionally, consumption of each unit of the good carries a health cost of H.
The consumer is willing to purchase the large or small menu and suffer a health cost to
relieve the intense impulse, but when faced with a weak impulse, is only willing to purchase
the small menu. Expected temptation-phase impulses may also enter the decision-making
process. If the consumer has purchased either a small or large menu, he immediately
consumes one unit of the good to fulfill a weak or intense impulse.
Assumption 13. Willingness to remove the intense impulse is greater than the cost of the
large menu, and willingness to remove the weak impulse is strictly between the costs of the
9 We may assume that 2pS > pL. Otherwise, there is no point in offering L.
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large menu and the small menu. That is:
IT −H > pL > IW −H > pS
This relationship serves to discretize the impulse distribution described in section 4.3:
If I > pL + H, it is classified as an intense impulse, and the probability of this is the
probability that a draw from Φ is greater than pL+H. Likewise, if I ∈ (pS +H, pL+H], it
is classified as a weak impulse. The prices of the menus are assumed to be exogenous but
if one wishes to model the decision of the firm this assumption can be modified. I assume
that pL and pS account for transaction costs.
After the initial purchase and consumption decisions, a consumer is faced with the
temptation to consume further, in the form of a second impulse, I ′. If either the small
or empty menus were purchased, this temptation-phase impulse will go unfulfilled. The
large menu allows for impulse fulfillment in the temptation phase, but creates additional
temptation.10
The probability of non-negligible impulses in the temptation phase depends on the menu
the consumer purchased. Let PR give the probability of each impulse in the temptation
phase if there are unconsumed items remaining, and P∅ the probability of each type of
impulse if there is no possibility of consumption.11 The difference [PR(T ) + PR(W )] −
[P∅(T ) + P∅(W )] is one measure of the consumer’s self-control. A higher value indicates
lower self-control.
Assumption 14 adapts Assumption 11 to the discrete model. As impulses with higher
values become more likely, they become more likely to be classified as intense, and more
likely to be classified as non-negligible.
Assumption 14. (Temptation) PR(T ) ≥ P∅(T ) and PR(T ) + PR(W ) ≥ P∅(T ) + P∅(W ).
10 Note also the marginal pecuniary cost of additional consumption is zero.
11 If S is purchased and one unit consumed, temptation-phase impulses will be unfulfilled. The same
goes for the case where the consumer purchased ∅.
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After purchase, consumption, and savings decisions are made, payoffs are tallied. If the
consumer has chosen menu m from {∅, S, L}, and has chosen consumption in initial and
temptation phases, c1 and c2, each from {0, 1} then utility is
U(c1, c2; I, I ′) = −(1− c1)(I)− (1− c2)(I ′)− (c1 + c2)H (4.8)
and surplus is U(c1, c2; I, I ′) − pm. The consumer chooses the menu m and, given the
temptation-phase impulses that follow, the consumption c1 and c2 that maximizes expected
surplus, Es(m)[U(c
1, c2; I, I ′)|I]− pm.
If the consumer purchased the large menu, it may have been with a plan to coldly
satisfy the expected impulses according to P∅. However, with the actual temptation of
the large menu, impulses occur more frequently according to PR, and when fulfilled do
not increase the payoff to the long-run self. PR also implies a higher expected health cost
relative to P∅. The expected payoff in the temptation phase following the purchase of a
large menu, initial consumption of one unit, and additional consumption conditional upon
non-negligible impulse is −H[PR(T ) + PR(W )] and the total expected utility is
Es(L)[U(1, c
2, I, I ′)] = −H −H[PR(T ) + PR(W )] (4.9)
I assume that if the consumer is able to resist an initial impulse, temptation-phase impulses
alone are insufficient to motivate purchase of even the small menu. Note that the consumer
that plans for temptation-phase impulses by purchasing the good and waiting to consume
it would face impulses from PR.
Assumption 15. Expected impulses in the temptation phase alone are not sufficient moti-
vation for the purchase of a small menu. That is, pS > PR(T )(IT −H) +PR(W )(IW −H).
Due to a commitment to the small menu there may be unfulfilled impulses in the temptation
phase.12 These impulses will not occur as frequently as when the consumer has purchased
12 We could allow the consumer to make an additional purchase at this point but I do not study this
situation here.
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the large menu. The expected payoff in the temptation phase following the purchase of a
small menu is −P∅(T )IT − P∅(W )IW and the total expected utility, including the health
cost of initial consumption is
Es(S)[U(1, 0, I, I
′)] = −H − P∅(T )IT − P∅(W )IW (4.10)
The empty menu commits the consumer to abstention and the unfulfilled impulses that
accompany it. The total expected utility is
Es(∅)[U(0, 0, I, I
′)] = −I − P∅(T )IT − P∅(W )IW (4.11)
4.4.1 Decisions in the One-Period Model
In the one-period model addiction is not a factor; the consumer simply chooses the menu
m which gives the greatest expected surplus, V s(m, I) − pm. Consumers are risk-neutral
with respect to temptation-phase impulses and must consider how purchase of the large
menu changes the impulse distribution in the temptation phase. The optimal decision rule
for the consumer depends on the prices of the small and large menus, pS and pL, as well
as consumer-specific parameters: health costs H, the strength of the initial impulse (IT or
IW ), and the distribution of temptation-phase impulses (P∅ and PR).
Lemma 15. A sophisticated consumer’s optimal decision rule when faced with a menu of
menus {∅, S, L} is:
1. In the case of intense impulse IT : Choose L if pL + H[PR(T ) + PR(W )] ≤ pS +
P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW and choose S otherwise.
2. In the case of weak impulse IW : Same decision rule.
3. In the case of negligible impulse IN : Choose ∅.
Proof. In cases 1 and 2, the empty menu is dominated by the small menu. It would be
better to choose ∅ only if IT ≤ pS + H but this violates Assumption 13. The payoffs in
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(4.9) and (4.10), net of the prices of the menus, form the basis for comparison of the large
and small menus. Case 3 is an immediate consequence of Assumption 15.
Lemma 16. A sophisticated consumer’s optimal decision rule, when faced with a menu of
menus {∅, L} is:
1. In the case of intense impulse IT :
Choose L if pL +H[1 + PR(T ) + PR(W )] ≤ IT + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW and choose ∅
otherwise.
2. In the case of weak impulse IW :
Choose L if pL +H[1 + PR(T ) + PR(W )] ≤ IW + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW and choose ∅
otherwise.
3. In the case of negligible impulse IN : Choose ∅.
Proof. The payoffs in (4.9) and (4.11), net of the prices of the respective menus, form the
basis for comparison of the large and empty menus.
Proposition 17. The relationship between policy on available menus and consumer choice
is as follows:
1. Any sophisticated consumer that chooses L from {∅, L} would choose L or S from
{∅, S, L}.
2. Any sophisticated consumer that chooses L from menu of menus {∅, S, L} would also
choose L from {∅, L}.
Proof. (1) When only menu L is available and an intense impulse is realized, the consumer
chooses menu L if (4.13) holds. Following a weak impulse, the consumer chooses L if (4.14)
holds. The condition for choosing a non-empty menu, S or L, is simply Assumption 13,
pS < IT − H. Either of (4.13) or (4.14) represents an additional necesary condition for
purchase of a non-empty menu when choices are restricted to {∅, L}.
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(2) When menu S is available and either an intense or weak impulse is realized, the
consumer chooses menu L if
pL +H[PR(T ) + PR(W )] ≤ pS + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW (4.12)
and chooses S otherwise.
When menu S is not available, the consumer chooses menu L following an intense impulse
if
pL +H[PR(T ) + PR(W )] ≤ IT −H + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW (4.13)
and chooses menu L following a weak impulse if
pL +H[PR(T ) + PR(W )] ≤ IW −H + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW (4.14)
According to Assumption 13, the right-hand side of both (4.13) and (4.14) is larger than
the right-hand side of (4.12). Hence, any consumer that chose L when S was available will
also choose L when S is not available, but the converse is not true. Some consumers will
choose S instead of L when both menus are available.
This result tells us that when choices of menus are restricted to exclude the small menu,
consumption of compulsive goods decreases at the extensive margin – more people choose
the empty menu – and increases in the intensive margin – of those who give in to the
impulse, more of them purchase the large menu. Because of the nature of temptation, we
would expect this to bring about greater consumption among those who purchase the good.
Effect of Policy
Absent any restrictions on the menus that are available, consumers rank the three menus
∅, S, and L according to the expected payoffs in (4.9), (4.10), and (4.11). Preference
rankings arise from the strength of the initial impulse, the relative prices of the small and
large menus, health costs, and the probabilities of temptation-phase impulses.
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Some consumers will have strong and frequent cravings, corresponding to preference
ranking L > S > ∅.13 The policy of removing S from the choice set will not induce
abstention. If a consumer’s ranking is ∅ > S > L,14 the consumer faces negligible
impulses, and is not made worse off by the presence of the small menu.
It is the consumer for whom S > ∅ > L 15 that “large menu or none” policies target.
Removing the small menu option induces these consumers to abstain from purchase of
the unhealthy product. Since our analysis of the one-period model ignores addiction,
the implication of a policy that induces the choice of a second-best option is that the
government knows the consumer is better off net of factors such as addiction and mistaken
hedonic forecasting which are not in the one-period sophisticated agent model.
In the case where S > L > ∅, the presence of the small menu improves the welfare
of a consumer who would otherwise choose the large menu to fulfill an intense impulse;
the small menu option also allows for lower consumption of the unhealthy good. These
consumers would be hurt by a policy restricting the sale of tempting goods to only large
menus.
4.4.2 Consumer Naivete
Some consumers are sophisticated and know the extent of their self-control problems, while
others are naive and incorrectly estimate the effect of temptation. A naive consumer
chooses a menu anticipating impulses from P∅ but a sophisticated consumer knows bet-
ter and anticipates the increased temptation of PR. If a naive consumer perceives that
temptation-phase impulses are distributed according to P∅ when in reality they are dis-
tributed according to PR, the evaluation of (4.9) is adjusted accordingly and a large menu
may be chosen. Ex-post, when faced with temptation, the consumer may regret her choice
of menu.
13 L > ∅ > S could also be included in this category but perhaps it is pathological.
14 Same for ∅ > L > S. The small menu option is inconsequential, and these preferences seem
pathological.
15 See lemmas 25 and 26 in the appendix for conditions under which these preferences arise.
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Lemma 18. The naive consumer’s optimal decision rule when faced with menu of menus
{∅, S, L} and either IT or IW is
Choose L if pL +H[P∅(T ) + P∅(W )] ≤ pS + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW and choose S otherwise.
Lemma 19. The naive consumer’s optimal decision rules when faced with menu of menus
{∅, L} are:
1. In the case of intense impulse IT :
Choose L if pL + H[1 + P∅(T ) + P∅(W )] ≤ IT + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW and choose ∅
otherwise.
2. In the case of weak impulse IW :
Choose L if pL + H[1 + P∅(T ) + P∅(W )] ≤ IW + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW and choose ∅
otherwise.
The analysis in Section 4.4.1 implies that the policy of removing the small menu from the
choice set cannot improve the welfare of a sophisticated consumer. It is possible that this
policy can protect a naive consumer but the following result combines Lemmas 18 and
19 to show that limiting menus to {∅, L} does not change the effect of naivete in the one
period model. We can re-write the decision rules for sophisticated and naive consumers to
find the maximum value of pL that would lead to purchase of the large menu, holding pS
and the consumer parameters fixed.
Proposition 20. 1. If ∅, S, and L are all available, a naive consumer with PR > P∅
has a higher willingness to pay for L than a sophisticated consumer.
2. If only ∅ and L are available, a naive consumer has a higher willingness to pay for L
than a sophisticated consumer.
Proof. (1) Rewriting the decision rules in lemmas 15 and 18, and holding all other pa-
rameters constant, we can find upper bounds for pL that would induce naive and sophis-
ticated consumers to choose L over S when faced with either a weak or intense impulse.
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The upper bound on pL for a naive consumer exceeds the upper bound for a sophisti-
cated consumer by H[PR(T ) + PR(W ) − (P∅(T ) + P∅(W ))]. This wedge is positive since
PR(T ) + PR(W ) > P∅(T ) + P∅(W ).
(2) Rewriting the decision rules in lemmas 16 and 19, we can find upper bounds for pL
that would induce naive and sophisticated consumers to choose L over ∅. This generates
the same result that the upper bound for a naive consumer exceeds the upper bound for a
sophisticated consumer by H[PR(T ) + PR(W )− (P∅(T ) + P∅(W ))].
Proposition 20 shows that the distortionary effect of naivete on the perceived value of the
large menu is not mitigated by removal of the small menu. It is also useful to notice that
naivete about temptation-phase impulses does not affect the payoffs to consumers who
choose the small menu; expectations of P∅ following purchase of S would be correct.
4.4.3 Two-Period Model
After all decisions and accounting for the present period are finished, the consumer’s im-
pulse distribution evolves for the next period. To bring addiction into the model, allow
the probabilities of intense and weak impulses to increase when at least one unit of the
good is consumed in period 1, consistent with Assumption 12. I use P(T1) and P(W1) for
the probabilities of IT and IW in period 1, and P(T2|c1) and P(W2|c1) for the probabilities
of intense and weak impulses in period 2, conditional upon total period-1 consumption,
c1 = c
1
1 + c
2
1.
Assumption 16. (Addiction) For c1 ≥ 1, P(T2|c1) ≥ P(T1) and P(T2|c1) + P(W2|c1) ≥
P(T1) + P(W1).
Additionally, it may be assumed that addiction is increasing in consumption: P(T2|c1 =
2) ≥ P(T2|c1 = 1) and P(T2|c1 = 2) + P(W2|c1 = 2) ≥ P(T2|c1 = 1) + P(W2|c1 = 1).
In this paper, I do not allow the consumer to save storable tempting goods, but we can
reflect on the consequences of adding this feature to the model. If there are saved goods
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on hand and the replacement cost is stationary, the consumer facing a weak impulse will
fulfill it by consumption of the saved goods. It is even possible that a negligible impulse
may be fulfilled, but according to the model specified above, if the consumer rejected
a temptation-phase impulse to save the remainder of the menu, then he can reject the
negligible impulse.
I examine the benchmark case of the sophisticated, farsighted consumer who knows the
distribution of temptation-phase impulses and the evolution of the impulse distribution,
which represents the addiction process. Optimal actions can be determined by backward
induction. In the second period, future impulses due to addiction are not a factor, but
we can still allow for costs to be as before, where the consumer coldly rejects a neglible
impulse. Lemmas 15 and 16 provide the decision rules for period 2.
Period 2 payoffs are determined by prices pS and pL and consumer parameters H, IT , IW
which are stationary across time, a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1], the probabilities of intense
and weak impulses in the initial phase of each period, P(T1), P(W1), P(T2|c1), P(W2|c1),
and the probabilities of intense and weak impulses in the temptation phase of each period,
P∅(T1), P∅(W1), PR(T1), PR(W1), P∅(T2), P∅(W2), PR(T2), PR(W2). The set of period-2
temptation-phase probabilities are dependent on both period-2 menu choice and period-1
consumption.
Some reasonable simplifying assumptions can be made to reduce the dimensionality of
the problem. In keeping with Assumption 16, consumption in the present period makes
the intense impulse more likely in the next period. With Kˆ ≥ K ≥ 1 ≥ k,
P(T2|c1) =

KˆP(T1), if c1 > 1
KP(T1), if c1 = 1
kP(T1), if c1 = 0
(4.15)
and the same relationship holds for P(W1) and P(W2).16
16 This assumes that Kˆ(P(T1)+P(W1)) ≤ 1. If not, then increases in P(T ) would have to be accompanied
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Let the probabilities of temptation-phase impulses be a constant multiple of the initial
impulses in their respective periods.
Assumption 17. (1) P∅(Tt) = a∅P(Tt) and P∅(Wt) = a∅P(Wt) for t = 1, 2. (2) PR(Tt) =
aRP(Tt) and PR(Wt) = aRP(Wt) for t = 1, 2. (3) a∅ ∈ (0, 1) and aR ∈ (a∅, 1).
Combining this assumption with the relationships described in (4.15), all impulse proba-
bilities can be related by constant multipliers to the period 1 initial-phase impulses. In
the first period, the sophisticated consumer knows the decision rules for period 2, and uses
this knowledge to weigh the period 1 impulses against health costs and effects of addiction.
Due to the many parameters, the problem is not highly tractible, but I will walk through
the steps of analysis and provide some general results. The following two lemmas describe
the decision rules for the consumer in period 2.
Lemma 21. Under Assumption 17, the optimal decision rules for period 2 when faced with
a menu of menus {∅, S, L} are:
1. In the case of intense impulse IT :
Choose L if pL +HaR[P(T2|c1) + P(W2|c1)] ≤ pS + a∅[P(T2|c1)IT + P(W2|c1)IW ] and
choose S otherwise.
2. In the case of weak impulse IW : Same decision rule.
3. In the case of negligible impulse IN : Choose ∅.
Proof. These are the conditions from Lemma 15 rewritten using (4.15) and Assumption
17.
Lemma 22. Under Assumption 17, the optimal decision rules for period 2 when faced with
a menu of menus {∅, L} are:
by decreases in P(W ) or restricted by some upper bound.
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1. In the case of intense impulse IT :
Choose L if pL +H +HaR[P(T2|c1) + P(W2|c1)] ≤ IT + ∅[P(T2|c1)IT + P(W2|c1)IW ]
and choose ∅ otherwise.
2. In the case of weak impulse IW :
Choose L if pL +H +HaR[P(T2|c1) + P(W2|c1)] ≤ IW + ∅[P(T2|c1)IT + P(W2|c1)IW ]
and choose ∅ otherwise.
3. In the case of negligible impulse IN : Choose ∅.
Proof. These are the conditions from Lemma 16 rewritten using (4.15) and Assumption
17.
Period 1 begins with either IT , IW , or IN . Though Assumption 15 precludes the
possibility of doing so in period 2, it is possible for the consumer to purchase the large
menu in period 1, then resist the subsequent temptation. Clearly, S is strictly preferred
to buying L then resisting temptation, though if S is unavailable, buying L then resisting
either the weak impulse or both weak and intense impulses may be preferred to the empty
menu.17 The expected payoffs for each period-1 menu and consumption plan are provided
in Section C.2 of the appendix.
V 2(·) is the period-2 “value” of following the optimal decision rule in period 2, with
the addiction update factor, Kˆ, K, or k, as its argument.18 Conveniently, because of the
relationship described in (4.15), the values of V 2(k), V 2(K), and V 2(Kˆ) differ only by the
constant factors relating the period 1 and period 2 initial-phase impulse distributions.
V 2(K) =
K
k
V 2(k)
V 2(Kˆ) =
Kˆ
k
V 2(k)
(4.16)
17 Purchasing S dominates purchasing L then not consuming in the temptation phase. However, the
latter may be the best option if consumers can save for period 2.
18 See appendix B for full expansion of the period-2 value.
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When facing a negligible impulse, the consumer will choose ∅. This is because period-1
impulses are not strong enough to justify purchase, and choice of the empty menu will
minimize the probability of impulses in period 2. Other definitive rules are difficult to pin
down, but Lemma 23 summarizes some facts about how the parameters of the problem
affect the optimal period-1 decision when a consumer faces a non-negligible impulse.
Lemma 23. For a given consumer, the parameters of the two-period model affect the
optimal period-1 decision in the following ways:
(1) An increase in H lowers the utility of S and L and makes ∅ relatively more attractive.
(2) An increase in prices makes ∅ more attractive and an increase in pL/pS increases the
utility of S relative to L.
(3) An increase in aRa∅
increases the utility of choices that reduce the effect of temptation,
S and ∅, relative to L.
(4) Decreases in Kˆ and K, the effects of addiction, increase the utility of L and S relative
to ∅.
(5) The effects of IT and IW are ambiguous and depend on the tradeoffs between period-1
and period-2 disutility, which is in turn dependent on β and the effects of addiction.
4.5 Future Extensions
The model described in this paper assumes that menu prices are exogenous, and policy
tools are limited to restriction of the small menu. In reality, firms choose menu sizes,
prices, and positioning of products among other things, and policy may provide guidance
on these and other decisions. Firms that have done market research know approximately
how many consumers are in each of the categories of behavioral types mentioned in Section
4.3.4. In order to maximize their profits, firms choose a menu of menus in the first period,
with commitment, knowing the characteristics of consumers and their likely decisions.
Government policy may restrict the firms’ choices.
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Cigarette manufacturers in the U.S. currently sell cigarettes in packs of twenty and
cartons of ten packs. Convenience stores sell small packages of candy and cookies to fulfill
impulses. Supermarkets sell both small and large packages, though the small packages are
strategically positioned where consumers linger, in order to induce impulses rather than
fulfill existing impulses.
It is not clear what the overall effect of small menus is on total profit. Small menus can
help consumers avoid excess temptation that leads to addiction and help casual consumers
with their self-control problems. As discussed in section 4.4.1, some consumers who would
otherwise select a small menu may rather purchase a large menu than nothing and if follow-
on temptation is consistent with Assumption 14, this can lead to higher-than-intended
consumption and addiction. Creating temptation and addiction may be bad for public
relations, but the firm can counter by shifting responsibility to the consumer. Some food
companies depict a culture of sports, exercise, and movement, sending the message that
weight problems are a result of lagging personal responsibility and insufficient exercise,
rather than overconsumption triggered by advertising and the changing composition of
foods (Brownell and Warner, 2009).
Retailers may wish to prioritize sales of packs to generate higher volume of sales, and
if offered, to price single cigarettes at a steep markup as an altenative for consumers
with occasional impulses. Secondhand vendors have emerged in many market to divide
otherwise indivisible goods. Businesses exist to help people share cars, apartments, and
many other durable goods. Yet among consumer-packaged goods, analogous “sharing”
or division of a large package into single units is often prohibited by restrictions put in
place by manufacturers and governments. Removing the restriction on the sale of single
cigarettes would allow retail outlets to capture an additional segment of the market, but
this may be a nuisance for them. Still, decrimininalizing distribution by ordinary citizens
or allowing a limited number of licenses makes the market contestable and incentivizes the
retailer to offer single cigarettes for a competitive price.
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4.6 Conclusion
Depending on the distribution of consumer types in a population, it may be welfare-
improving to offer goods in a variety of package sizes to consumers, so impulses may be
fulfilled while minimizing temptation and addiction. Even if the price of a single unit of a
compulsive good is close to the price of a multi-unit pack, the availability of the option can
reduce harmful excess consumption. This may be relevant to policy on minimum cigarette
package size.
Another application is in the arena of foods (Brownell and Warner, 2009), specifically
those foods for which consumers have impulses. A small serving can fulfill an impulse, but
a package containing multiple servings can lead to excess temptation and consumption,
which in turn perpetuates future impulses. With foods which consumers are unlikely to
view as harmful or potentially addictive, there is a strong heuristically-driven motive to
seek the best bargain. Consumers may see the high per-unit price of addictive foods in
small packages as “unfair” or “uneconomical” and opt for a package that is larger than the
impulse demanded. Once in possession of the larger package, it is easy for the consumer,
naive about the health and addiction costs, to consume more than planned. This suggests
that pricing guidance may be a welfare-improving policy.
There is an important caveat to promoting a wider variety of package sizes as a harm
reduction strategy. Smaller portion packages can lead to greater future consumption among
those who are not already addicted or experienced in use of the product. For the type of
consumer who has weak impulses, a small package provides cost-effective gratification, and
no consumption is a second-best alternative. If this type of consumer is also naive about
their own addiction, then it may be best not to allow access to the smaller package and
disincentivize purchase by consumers who are merely curious or have occasional cravings.
Empirical studies on the strength of impulses and likelihood of addiction following infequent
consumption would be necessary to address this question.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Discussion
Social dissonance games can be used to model situations where the conformity motive plays
a role in individual decision-making. My analysis focuses on games with two actions. In the
finite-agent games discussed in the first chapter, equilibria have a monotonicity property:
those players who intrinsically like an action the most will be the ones to choose it. These
games are supermodular, which is to say there are complementarities among the players’
strategies. By applying the results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) we can guarantee
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium and monotone comparative statics with respect
to intrinsic utilities and social dissonance. If the intrinsic utility of one action relative to
the other increases for all players, the equilibrium set shifts toward action profiles where
more players choose that action. Likewise, if the social dissonance for one action decreases
relative to the other action for all possible profiles, the equilibrium set again shifts toward
that action.
Analogous results hold in social dissonance games with a continuum of agents, as dis-
cussed in the second chapter. Equilibria are monotone and the games are supermodular,
hence the results of Yang and Qi (2013) can be used to guarantee monotone comparative
statics with respect to intrinsic utilities and social dissonance. However, the finite-agent
and continuum-of-agents models diverge with respect to the asymmetric action profiles that
92
93
may be equilibria. In finite-agent games with an assumption that dissonance is strictly de-
creasing, it is possible to have asymmetric behavior among a group of agents who are
indifferent between two alternatives, but any two identical agents that strictly prefer one
of the alternatives must choose alike. In games with a continuum of agents, asymmetric
behavior may be observed in equilibrium among a positive-measure group of agents with
the same intrinsic preferences.
While asymmetric equilibria may seem like razor-edge scenarios, they can be important
in understanding the preservation of inefficient norms. In the finite agent games, coordi-
nation of indifferent agents on a single action can cause unnecessary discomfort for those
who prefer the other action, relative to an equilibrium where these indifferent agents are
more evenly split between the two actions. In the continuum of agents game with players
divided into two camps each with identical intrinsic preferences, one camp may be split
into those who are true and those who sell out.
Just as the actions and beliefs of people around us, actual or imagined, influence our
own behavior, the objects we purchase can also influence our behavior in ways that we
do not anticipate. In “Impulse and Temptation,” I set up a framework for answering
the question of whether harmful consumer goods should be available in small packages to
satisfy cravings. Policy must balance the lower cost of the small package, which lowers
the threshold of a craving that induces purchase, against the increased temptation and
subsequent habit formation associated with the larger package. In a version of the model
with a discretized distribution of impulses to consume the harmful good, the effect of
making the small package unavailable depends on the second-best alternative for consumers
who prefer the small package. In general, fewer consumers will purchase the product, but
of those who do, more will purchase the large package and be tempted toward greater
consumption.
Since a policy banning the sale of small packages of harmful goods seems welfare-
reducing in a one-period model, I explore alternative justifications for the policy. Consumer
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naivete about temptations is one possible justification. However, removing the small menu
from consideration does nothing to alleviate mistakes due to incorrectly forecast tempta-
tions. In a two-period model, it is unclear whether prohibiting the sale of small menus helps
consumers to avoid addiction or improve welfare. This question would require data on the
perceived and actual likelihood of addiction following the consumption of small quantities
of impulse goods.
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Appendix A
Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 General Two-Action Games
Lemma 24. Suppose s is an equilibrium, ∆ui = ∆uj and si 6= sj. For any two agents
with ∆uk = ∆uk
′ 6= ∆ui, sk = sk′.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that si = A and sj = B. If ∆uk > ∆uj then
uk(B)−uk(A) = uk′(B)−uk′(A) > uj(B)−uj(A) so by monotonicity, sk = B and sk′ = B.
Likewise, if ∆uk < ∆uj then uk(A) − uk(B) = uk′(A) − uk′(B) > uj(A) − uj(B) and it
must be that sk = sk
′
= A.
A.1.2 Two-Type Games
The following proofs are for the game with agents of only two different values of ∆ui.
Assume throughout that ua(A) > ua(B) and ub(B) > ub(A).
Existence of Equilibria in Two-Type Game:
The following discussion gives the set of equilibria for different configurations of the game
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and also provides a sketch of an existence proof done by enumeration of all possibilities.
There are three 1 possible configurations of {∆ua,∆ub, d}, as shown in the table below.
If the social dissonance of being the only person to choose that action is outweighed
by the gap in intrinsic utility between an agent’s preferred and non-preferred actions, the
agent will always choose true to type; it is a dominant strategy. If this is so for both
types of agents as in case (1), then only a true-to-type equilibrium is possible, since the
best response for all agents is to choose their intrinsically-preferred action regardless of the
actions of others.
In case (2), there is one type that has a dominant strategy of choosing true to its
intrinsic preference. If there are not enough agents of the type with the weaker preference,
then the true-to-type conditions do not hold and the only equilibrium is monolithic in the
action of the dominant type.
In case (3), both monolithic-A and monolithic-B equilibria always exist. In addition,
there is a true-to-type equilibrium if the true-to-type conditions hold. The table summa-
rizes the existence of equilibria in each case. “ttt” denotes existence if and only if the
true-to-type conditions hold.
Case Parameters True-to-Type Monolithic-A Monolithic-B
1 ∆ua > d(A, 0) and ∆ub > d(B, 0) Yes No No
2A ∆ua > d(A, 0) and ∆ub < d(B, 0) ttt Yes No
2B ∆ua < d(A, 0) and ∆ub > d(B, 0) ttt No Yes
3 ∆ua < d(A, 0) and ∆ub < d(B, 0) ttt Yes Yes
Monotonicity
Claim For the two-action, two-type game, in equilibrium, at least one agent of one type
plays against-type, then all agents of the other type play true-to-type.
1 There are more cases where ∆ua or ∆ub might be exactly equal to d(A, 0) or d(B, 0) respectively.
These are left to the reader.
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Proof. Suppose s is an equilibrium where Nˆb(s) type-b agents choose B, with Nˆb(s) ∈
{0, 1, 2, ..., Nb} and at least one type-a plays action B, so Nˆa(s) > 0 and Nˆa(s) < Na.
∃i ∈ {1, 2, ..., Na} who chooses B and therefore has ua(A) − d(A,Ns−i(A)) ≤ ua(B) −
d(B,Ns−i(B)). Since u
a(A) > ua(B), we must have d(A,Ns−i(A)) > d(B,Ns−i(B)) for
this agent i.
Now, from the perspective of any other agent j, the tally of other agents who choose B,
N−j(B) may exclude agent j but it will definitely include agent i, whereas agent i was not
included in the tally N−i(B). That is, N−j(B) ≥ N−i(B). Likewise, N−j(A) ≤ N−i(A).
This makes the decision of a type-b agent easy. For any agent j 6= i, d(A,Ns−j (A)) ≥
d(A,Ns−i(A)) and d(B,Ns−j (B)) ≤ d(B,Ns−i(B)) so d(A,Ns−j (A)) > d(B,Ns−j (B)). For
a type-b, ub(B) > ub(A) so we will have
ub(B)− d(B,Ns−j (B) > ub(A)− d(A,Ns−j (A))
That is, when in equilibrium type-a’s are mixing or all playing B, it follows that a
type-b’s only best response is to choose B. We cannot have mixing for both type-a and
type-b. Similar logic applies for the case where type-b mixes; if that is so, then we must
have Nˆa(s) = Na.
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A.2 Figures
Figure A.1: Survey Responses to “Do you think marriages between same-sex couples should
or should not be recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional mar-
riages?” (source: Gallup)
Appendix B
Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs
Corollary 3: In the two-action, two-type game, if in equilibrium some agents of one type
play against type, then all agents of the other type must play true-to-type.
Proof. Assume that ua(A) > ua(B) and ub(B) > ub(A). Suppose in equilibrium, under ac-
tion profile s, that some type-a agents choose A and some type-b agents choose B. Denote
by µˆa(s) the measure of type-a agents who choose A, and by µˆb(s) the measure of type-b
agents who choose B. Suppose further that some type-a’s choose B in this equilibrium.
The measure of those agents is µa − µˆa(s) > 0. The measure of type-b’s that choose A is
µb − µˆb(s), though we have not determined whether this is positive or not.
If some type-a choose B then
ua(B)− d(B,µa − µˆa(s) + µˆb(s)) ≥ ua(A)− d(A, µˆa(s) + (µb − µˆb(s)))
Since ua(A) > ua(B), in order for the inequality above to hold, it must be that
d(A, µˆa(s) + (µb − µˆb(s))) > d(B,µa − µˆa(s) + µˆb(s)) (B.1)
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This, combined with the fact that ub(B) > ub(A) implies that
ub(B)− d(B,µa − µˆa(s) + µˆb(s)) ≥ ub(A)− d(A, µˆa(s) + (µb − µˆb(s)))
Hence, only B is a best response for type-b agents. An analogous argument can be made
to show that if some type-b’s choose A in equilibrium, then only A is a best response for
type-a agents.
Appendix C
Chapter 4
C.1 Additional Proofs
Lemma 25. Consumers facing a weak impulse can have preference ranking S > L > ∅.
Proof. It must be that −U(S) < −U(L) < −U(∅). In order to have this, it must be that:
pL +H + PR(T )H + PR(W )H < IW + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW (C.1)
and
pS + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW < pL + PR(T )H + PR(W )H (C.2)
Let G = P∅(T )IT +P∅(W )IW−(PR(T )H+PR(W )H). By Assumption 13, pL+H > IW ,
so it must be that G > pL +H − IW in order for (C.1) to hold. Meanwhile, pL > pS so it
must be that G < pL − pS . for (C.2) to hold. By Assumption 13, H − IW < −pS , so G is
contained in a non-empty interval (pL+H−IW , pL−pS) and there are not any restrictions
on the relationship between P∅ and PR that preclude G from being in this interval.
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Lemma 26. Consumers facing a weak impulse can have preference ranking S > ∅ > L.
Proof. It must be that −U(S) < −U(∅) < −U(L). In order to have this, it must be that:
pS + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW < IW + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW (C.3)
and
IW + P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW < pL +H + PR(T )H + PR(W )H (C.4)
IW > pS by assumption 13 so (C.3) is always true. Also by Assumption 13, pL +H −
IW > 0 so we need only P∅(T )IT + P∅(W )IW − (PR(T )H + PR(W )H) < pL +H − IW for
(C.4) to be true. There are no restrictions on the relationship between P∅ and PR that
preclude this. This is simply a bound on how costly expected unfulfilled temptation-phase
impulses are relative to the expected health cost of fulfilled temptations.
C.2 Expected Payoffs
Here, I write out in longhand the expected costs associated with each menu choice when
facing different impulses.
C.2.1 One Period Model
When facing IT , the total costs of purchasing each menu and consuming optimally are:
∅: IT + P1(T )IT + P1(W )IW
S: pS +H + P1(T )IT + P1(W )IW
L: pL +H[1 + P2(T ) + P2(W )]
When facing IW , the total costs of purchasing each menu and consuming optimally are:
∅: IW + P1(T )IT + P1(W )IW
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S: pS +H + P1(T )IT + P1(W )IW
L: pL +H[1 + P2(T ) + P2(W )]
C.2.2 Two Period Model
When ∅, S, L are all available,
V (k) = k(P(T1) + P(W1))min{pL + H + aR[P(T2)H + P(W2)H], pS + H + ∅[P(T2)IT +
P(W2)IW ]}
V (K) = K(P(T1) + P(W1))min{pL + H + aR[P(T2)H + P(W2)H], pS + H + ∅[P(T2)IT +
P(W2)IW ]}
V (Kˆ) = Kˆ(P(T1) + P(W1))min{pL + H + aR[P(T2)H + P(W2)H], pS + H + ∅[P(T2)IT +
P(W2)IW ]}
When only ∅, L are available,
V (k) = kP(T1)min{pL +H + aR[P(T2)H + P(W2)H], IT + ∅[P(T2)IT + P(W2)IW ]}
+ kP(W1)min{pL +H + aR[P(T2)H + P(W2)H], IW + ∅[P(T2)IT + P(W2)IW ]}
V (K) = KP(T1)min{pL +H + aR[P(T2)H + P(W2)H], IT + ∅[P(T2)IT + P(W2)IW ]}
+KP(W1)min{pL +H + aR[P(T2)H + P(W2)H], IW + ∅[P(T2)IT + P(W2)IW ]}
V (Kˆ) = KˆP(T1)min{pL +H + aR[P(T2)H + P(W2)H], IT + ∅[P(T2)IT + P(W2)IW ]}
+ KˆP(W1)min{pL +H + aR[P(T2)H + P(W2)H], IW + ∅[P(T2)IT + P(W2)IW ]}
When there is no consumption in period 1, probabilities of intense and weak impulses
are kP(T1) and kP(W1). When either of these impulses is realized, the agent uses the
decision rules in lemmas 21 and 22. If a negligible impulse is realized, ∅ is chosen.
When facing intense impulse IT in period 1, the expected costs of each possible menu and
consumption plan are:
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∅: IT + ∅[P(T1)IT + P(W1)IW ] + βV (k)
S: pS +H + ∅[P(T1)IT + P(W1)IW ] + Kk βV (k)
L, resist IT and IW : pL +H + aR[P(T1)IT + P(W1)IW ] + Kk βV (k)
L, resist IW : pL +H + aR[P(T1)(H + β Kˆk V (Kˆ)) + P(W1)(IW + β
K
k V (k))]
L, give in: pL +H + aR[P(T1)H + P(W1)H] + β Kˆk V (k)
When facing weak impulse IW in period 1, the expected costs of each possible menu and
consumption plan are:
∅: IW + ∅[P(T1)IT + P(W1)IW ] + βV (k)
S: pS +H + ∅[P(T1)IT + P(W1)IW ] + βKk V (k)
L, resist IT and IW : pL +H + aR[P(T1)IT + P(W1)IW ] + βKk V (k)
L, resist IW : pL +H + aR[P(T1)(H + β Kˆk V (k)) + P(W1)(IW + β
K
k V (k))]
L, give in: pL +H + aR[P(T1)H + P(W1)H] + β Kˆk V (k)
